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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I 
Did the Department of Employment Security deny Peti-
tioner Ellison, Inc. its constitutional rights to a fair and 
impartial tribunal and a fair hearing where the Depart-
ment's Administrative Law Judge acted as both the attorney 
and prosecutor for the Department and also as the Tribunal 
sitting as the trier of fact and law? Particularly where 
the Department had on its payroll attorneys who could have 
readily represented the Department? 
II 
OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Appendix A) 
The opinion issued herein by the Court of Appeals is 
found at 76 Utah Advanced Reports, 13, (Ct. App. 02/19/88). 
Ill 
JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS 
Jurisdiction in this Court is based on U.C.A. 78-2-
2(3)(a) and Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, Rule 43. 
A. The entry date of the decision sought to be 
reviewed is February 19, 1988. 
B. An extension was granted by this Court for 
the filing of this Petition to April 19, 1988. 
IV 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
1. United States Constitution Amendments 5 and 14 as 
follows: 
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Amendment V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capi-
tal , or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a pre-
sentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in 
the Militia, when in actual service in time of War 
or public danger; nor shall any person be subject 
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Amendment XIV 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of 
the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
2. Constitution of Utah Article I, Section 7 as 
follows: 
Due Process of Law. No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
3. Utah Code Annotated 35-4-10, as amended. Review 
of decision or determination, appeal referees, Board of 
Review, witness fees, judicial review by Court of Appeals, 
and exclusive procedure as follows: 
(a) A review of a decision or determina-
tion involving contribution liability or applica-
tions for refund shall be made by the commission 
or its authorized representative in accordance 
with the provisions of this act. The decision of 
the representative conducting the review is deemed 
the decision of the commission. The commission or 
its authorized representative conducting the 
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review may refer the matter to an appeal referee, 
may decide the application for review on the basis 
of any facts and information as may be obtained or 
may, in its discretion, hear argument or hold a 
hearing to secure further facts. After the 
review, notice of the decision shall be given to 
the employing unit The decision made pursuant to 
the review is the final decision of the commission 
unless, within ten days after the date of notifica-
tion or mailing of the decision, further appeal 
is Initiated under the provision?. -,t this section. 
(b) Within ten days after the mailing 01* 
personal delivery of a notice of a determination 
or decision rendered following a review under sub-
section (a), an employing unit may appeal to an 
appeal referee by filing a notice of appeal. The 
appeal referee shall give notice of the pendency 
of the appeal to the commission, which is then a 
party to the proceedings. After affording the 
parties reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing, 
he shall make findings and conclusions and on that 
basis affirm, modify, or reverse the determina-
tion. The parties shall be promptly notified of 
the referee's decision and furnished a copy of the 
decision and findings. The decision is the final 
decision of the commission unless within ten days 
after the date of mailing of notice to the part-
ies1 last known addresses or in the absence of a 
mailing within ten days after the delivery of 
notice, further appeal is initiated under th^ pro-
visions of this section. 
The commission shall appoint one 
more impartial appeal referees consisting in 
each case of a salaried referee selected in 
accordance with Section 35-4-11(d) to hear and 
decide referrals or appeals relating to claims for 
benefits or to decisions affecting employing units 
referred to. No referee may participate in any 
case in which he is an interested party. Each 
decision of a referee shall represent his independ-
ent judgment (Emphasis added) 
V 
STATEMENT H- THE i„ ASF 
Thi "-. a petition for a Writ of Certiorari pursuant 
-. - j (3) (a), Utah Code Annoted 1953, from c. cec;-
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sion of the Utah Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of 
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission which up-
held an Administrative Law Judge holding that wages paid to 
drivers contracting with the Employer-Petitioner, Ellison, 
Inc., constitute wages for service as employment pursuant to 
Subsection 35-4-22(j ) (1), 35-4-22(j ) (5 ) and 35-4-22(p) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act (hereinafter "the Act11). 
On May 23, 1986 a Field Auditor of the Utah Department 
of Employment Security made a status determination in regard 
to the Petitioner (hereinafter also referred to as "Ellison, 
Inc." or "the employer"), determining that truck drivers 
operating in interstate commerce as contracted by the employ-
er were in employment under the provisions of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. 
Ellison, Inc. filed an appeal to the Appeals Tribunal 
dated May 23, 1986. R.0028 A hearing was held before the 
Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter "ALJ") on October 6, 
1986. The ALJ issued a decision in Case No. 86-A-3577 on 
October 28, 1986 affirming the decision of the Field 
Auditor. 
On November 6, 1986 Ellison, Inc. appealed to the 
Board of Review. R.0093-0095 The Board of Review affirmed 
the decision of the ALJ on January 6, 1987 in Case No. 
86-BR-549 (see Appendix C). Appeal was taken to the Utah 
Court of Appeals which affirmed on February 19, 1988. (All 
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"R" prefix nr) I at ions n«tn» t.'i paqes fr. • he record and arr 
duplicated imeii-rtl "id " miulix.) 
STATEMENT OP PACTS 
(Appendix C) 
i i i u r^ r i no wa **• : t i t ; K~ 
H o n o r a b l e Kenneth -._.w.-, *.../. 
i s Apparent ^ . ^ed and pa id a s a l a r y h ; t*«o Commissiun* 
i i 11 I , aliU L> * >-rV, ifC r^ r^P i r5ent 
and ma 3or s t o c k h o l d e r , David E l l i s o n , ami Ui rough i i ii« til 
• i u hpxte i L. Andersoi i . The Department d id not have an 
a t t o r n e y p r e s e n t arin " > i > > ' + ' l ^ i r f n » rit" e x n j . t 
tf"iea ALJ. The on ly r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e Department was ' h e 
I it ' l i l Audi I i mi IIII I Ii c a s t
 f Hi*, Drow H i r i s t e n s e n . He p l a y e d 
no roi i excep t ID i v t r i e r e . liiJt». mi i 1 r < n i I I M I ^ C I I 
a few p r e l i m i n a r y q u e s t i o n s , P r i m a r i l y , Mr. U h r i s t e n s e n ' s 
respoi.S'." w , "\Wib u >i I ! \ i l » l^ni^ni i f cont ro l wn^ t h p 
o w n e r s h i p of t h e t r u c k s " . Q u e s t i o n by (Jit AI.ni, ' IUI>' ui n i 
i nd i e . i l or of c o n t r o l ? " Answer by C h r i s t e n s e n r " « ' . e , i u s t 
t h e 'I " ' II , 
The b a l a n c e of t h e p r o s e c u t i o n was c o n d u c t e d by t h e 
Ah I I (KMfii 0084 Before - a r i ^ h . Kan handoi cKec t h e 
f o u r w i t n e s s e s ( t r u c k d r i -
w i t n e s s e s , t h a t he wanted * -c-r * • •: . -.v.- re ie j?none 
i h mi in I 11 in i iii i 11 prjt am iipn I j nad p r e p a r e d WK-«* 
e x h i b i t s he wanted t o r e c t i <.» ..* : ,i~ ^ « p ; ,.u:b-„ 
the hearing he announced that the exhibits were received, 
(R.0046 sixth paragraph) 
The ALJ then proceeded to explain and comment on each 
exhibit, demonstrating that he had already reviewed and 
interpreted them. (R.0046-0048 middle of the page). 
The ALJ then proceeded to call his prearranged witness-
es and asked them the questions he wanted to hear answers 
to. R.0048-0050; 0054 third paragraph-0057; 0060-0064; 
0067-0070; 0073-0076. 
The ALJ had also apparently sent some of the exhibits 
and information to the witnesses before the hearing itself 
for their review. (R.0054 last paragraph, also R.0055 
bottom half of page) 
Based on the evidence produced, offered, and received 
by the ALJ, he then proceeded to determine the case solely 
and completely in favor of the Department. R.0086-91. 
VII 
ARGUMENT 
1. The procedure followed by the Commission and 
Department by and through their ALJ violated Petitioner's 
right to fair due process as provided by the Constitution of 
the United States and the State of Utah. It also violated 
the "fair hearing1 and "impartial appeal referee" provision 
of U.C.A. 35-4-10. The procedure followed also violated 
this Court's mandate set forth in Anderson vs. Industrial 
Commission, 69 6 P .2d 1219 (Utah 1985- timl Bunnel l VB • 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission, 11 i 111 1 \1 i w \\ 198 7 ) . 
11 i s pa t e n 11 y u n f a i r I o i t h e A hi I i o a n s u im 
p,, u r o s e c u t o r or a d v o c a t e for Hie Depar tment # a r r a n q n t h e 
w i t n e s s e s h^ want:" f n I'lrvii I r r tin i "nl 1 H< ' ,i,M| n u i ,> *> 
r e c e i v e «" documents he wan* - r e c e i v e * q u e s t i o n the wif-
n e s : dii tb u ii f 1IP answers tc
 9 nnri 
g e n e r a , ** i n d u c t tr**. S c a l i n g nn i | I ill I In lH-)mi lini ' iit , 
- •> •• «•"*-- ~ - T r i b u n a l , s - t e r m i n i n g t h e f a c t s a n i ' l«»w in 
i r q u m p n t i s a l s o f o r -
t i f i e d by c f a c t m a * .- •-. - i p l u y e d and pa iu , I he 
Commissio - *-*^r it * . * t o e n f o r c e t h e 
unepployim : * * :> 
I n
 Anderson v s . Indus t r : 3 Commission (Appendix P ] , 
tl'iii * eu n u i lj_ t> M _:rchison a s f o l l o w s : 
"-. iaxx . _ ,^ ^ _ . . l i b u n a i i s a o a s i c 
r e ^ n ; • ^ ^ e n t of due p r o c e s s * 
1;:« j * ' i i n m e 
Anderson c a s e t h a t : 
" F a i r n e s s r e q u i r e s no t o n l y an a b s e n c e of 
a c t u ' - io. endeavor ' s t o p r e v e n t even t h e 
pes s , i . 1: t -• r:f a i r n e s s . " 
r
'>~>* ' j ^ i n c i p l e a p p l i e s w i t h a s much f o r c e 
t o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g s a s i t does t o i n d i -
c i a ] t r i a l s - . . . " 
U.C.A* jb S c a r e s t h e '..YHMIM S S I »»n ,i | »a i" I ,'"'"' in ,i 
c o n t e s t e d m a t t e r whp^* *ie Commission f i n d s t h a t an employer 
musi ,. ^ iifi • l a r e s i i i i i I In ALJ be i m p a r t i a l . 
Thus, in this case and similar cases, the Commission is one 
party and the alleged employer is the other party. Between 
the two sides there must be an impartial tribunal to hear 
the evidence and agrument produced by both parties, who then 
determine the case in fairness to both sides. Certainly 
lack of counsel did not force the Department to rely on the 
ALJ to conduct their case for them. The Department and 
Commission employ several attorneys who could have repre-
sented them as a "partyw at the hearing before the ALJ. 
Under the American and State of Utah system of juris-
prudence, each party is represented by an advocate who pro-
duces evidence and makes argument to an impartial tribunal 
to assure a fair hearing for both parties. This Court has 
required the same in the Anderson and Bunnell cases 
cited. The Commission, the Department, and the ALJ failed 
when the ALJ acted as both prosecutor for the Department and 
trier of fact and law between the parties, particularly 
where the Department is well represented by staff attorneys. 
This Court's Writ of Certiorari must be issued to 
review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals who, with-
out proper consideration, denied this same point on appeal. 
DATED this 2 . ^ day o£^Mafdh, 1988. 
DEXTER^ j^ *ftt)ERSON 
AttorneQ^/for Employer-
Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy oi the 
foregoing PETITIONER'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI to 
the Attorney for the Respondents, Lorin R. Blauer, 1234 
South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84147, postage 
pr epa i n , t 'i i s *'jjj'< day of March, 1988. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo—~ 
Ellison, Inc., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Department of Employment 
Security, 
APPENDIX A Page 1 of 5 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 870034-CA 
Respondent. 
Before Judges Billings, Orme and Murphy.* F I L E D 
FEB 191988 
BILLINGS, Judge: Ttrr.othy M. Shea Clerk o< the Court 
Uteh Court ot Appeals 
Petitioner Ellison, Inc. ("Ellison") appeals from an 
Industrial Commission order affirming an administrative 
determination that Ellison was liable for contributions to the 
Unemployment Compensation Fund on sums it paid to truck 
drivers. On appeal, Ellison seeks a reversal of the 
Commission's order or, alternatively, a modification of the 
order limiting its scope to the four truck drivers who 
testified at the administrative hearing. We affirm. 
This action results from a Department of Employment 
Security field audit of Ellison wherein the auditor concluded 
Ellison "employed" fifteen truck drivers. Ellison petitioned 
for a hearing and the appeal referee held the amounts paid to 
truck drivers contracting with Ellison constituted wages for 
services in employment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-4-22(j)(l), 35-4-22(j)(5)(A)-(C), and 35-4-22(p) (1985) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act ("the Act"). The appeal 
referee assessed Ellison for contributions, interest, and 
penalties totaling $9,698.46. 
Ellison purchases hay from farms in Utah and sells it to 
* Michael R. Murphy, Judge, Third Judicial District Court, 
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3-24(l)(j) (1987) 
buyers primarily in southern California. Ellison engages truck 
drivers to haul the hay to California in trucks owned by the 
company, and has the drivers haul back whatever freight is 
available. The drivers own no interest in Ellison and do not 
share in its profits. Ellison owns the tractor/trailers and 
pays all operational and maintenance costs of the vehicles. 
Ellison assigns which truck the driver will operate. The 
drivers are not allowed to use the trucks for personal reasons. 
Whenever a load of hay is to be shipped, Ellison contacts 
a driver. Ellison contracts with the truck drivers on a 
purported "independent contractor11 basis. These contracts are 
either oral or written. Paragraph 6(c) of the written contract 
requires the driver to personally perform the services. The 
driver may accept or reject the assignment. If the assignment 
is accepted, the driver must deliver the load within a time 
designated by Ellison. The driver picks up the truck at a 
place designated by Ellison. All of the expenses, with the 
exception of personal expenses, are paid by Ellison. After the 
hay is delivered, the driver contacts Ellison regarding 
possible freight to haul back to Utah. In most instances, 
Ellison specifies the freight the driver is to pick up. The 
drivers are paid according to a wage schedule set by Ellison. 
This schedule delineates the wages for loading, unloading, and 
driving trips between various destinations. 
Four drivers testified at the administrative hearing. 
The appeal referee examined each driver-witness without 
objection by Ellison. Ellison, in turn, cross-examined each 
driver. At the commencement of the hearing, the appeal referee 
had in his possession all of the documents generated by the 
field audit and received them into evidence "subject to 
exception or comment." Ellison made no Objection. 
The three issues presented on appeal are: 
(1) Do the sums paid to the fifteen truck drivers 
contracting with Ellison during the period of the 
audit constitute wages for services as employment 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(1), 
35-4-22(j)(5) (1985), or are they excluded under the 
ABC test of the Act? 
(2) Is the evidence sufficient to support the 
administrative determination that Ellison "employed" 
all fifteen truck drivers during the period of the 
audit when only four of the drivers testified at the 
administrative hearing? 
(3) Was Ellison denied a fair and impartial hearing? 
870034-CA 2 
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UTAH EMPLOYMENT 6ECURITY ACT 
Whether the truck drivers ere ••employees* within the 
meaning of the Act is a mixed question of law and fact. Our role 
in reviewing the Commission's findings of basic facts is limited 
by Utah Code Ann. S 35-4-10(1) (1987) which provides that if the 
Commission's findings of fact are supported by the evidence, 
these findings are conclusive. Superior Cahlavlalon Installers. 
Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 688 P.2d 444, 447 (Utah 1984). 
Although we defer to the Commission's special expertise, LLtih 
Pep't of Admin. 6ervs» v. Public Serv, Coram*n, 658 P.2d 601, 6io 
(Utah 1983), we review its decision to determine if it falls 
within the limits of reasonableness or rationality. Barnev v. 
Department of Employment Bec>* 681 p.2d 1273, 1275 (Utah 1984); 
Utah Pep't Of Admin. Servs., 658 P.2d at €08. Thus, *[w]e are 
confined to a determination of whether the facts support the 
conclusion of law or whether the decision is contrary to the 
evident purpose of the statute." Barnev, 681 P.2d at 1275. 
Ellison does not dispute the Commission's determination 
that the truck drivers performed personal services for wages as 
defined in the Act. Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-1, 35-4-22(j)(l), 
35-4-22(p) (1985). Rather, Ellison contends that it is excluded 
as an employer under Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5)(A)-(C) 
(1985).! 
On appeal, Ellison urges us to apply subsections (A)-(C) of 
section 35-4-22(j)(5) in the disjunctive. In this way, if 
Ellison satisfies the requirements for one subsection, it would 
be excluded from the Act. However, case law interpreting the 
application of these subsections is well settled. The 
requirements of all three subsections must be satisfied in order 
to exclude the employer from compliance with the Act. Nielsen v. 
Department of Employment Sec, 692 P.2d 774# 776 (Utah 1984); 
North Am. Builders, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Div., 22 
Utah 2d 338, 340 n.l, 453 P.2d 142, 143 n.l (1969). Ellison 
argues that the 1971 amendments to section 35-4-22(j)(5)(A)-(C) 
resulted in a disjunctive application of the ABC test. The 1971 
amendments inserted a comma in place of the word "and" at the end 
of subsection (A). Ellison argues that the comma has the same 
meaning as "or" and, therefore, the exclusions should be applied 
disjunctively. Common sense, grammatical construction, and an 
absence of any legislative history to support this construction 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-22(j)(5)(A)-(C) was amended in 1986 
to delete subsection (B). Subsection (C) is now the new 
subsection (B). This amendment, however, is not relevant to 
our decision. 
870034-CA 3 
defeat Ellison9! position.2 fiaa Allen t ABBQCB. V. 
Industrial Comm'n, 732 P,2d 508, 509 (Utah 1987) (Utah Supreme 
Court applies the AB test in the conjunctive). 
The Commission determined that the truck drivers were 
under Ellison9s "direction and control," and that the drivers 
were not "customarily engaged in an independently established 
trade • . . of the same nature as that Involved in the contract 
of service.9* Therefore, the Commission concluded that neither 
subsection (A) nor subsection (C) was met in this case. 
Since the ABC test is conjunctive, we only discuss whether 
Ellison satisfied subsection (C). There is substantial 
evidence in the record to support the Commission's conclusion 
that subsection (C) was not satisfied because the truck drivers 
were not engaged in independently established trades. 
The intent of subsection (C) is to exclude those workers 
who have independently established businesses on which they can 
rely should their separate employment relationships be 
terminated. New Sleep, Inc. v. Department of Employment Sec, 
703 P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1985), "[A)n independently established 
business is one which is created and exists apart from a 
relationship with a particular employer and which survives the 
termination of that relationship. Its continued existence does 
not depend on a relationship with any one employer. Thus, a 
significant aspect of this test is the relationship between the 
alleged employer and the employee." Superior Cablevision, 688 
P.2d at 447. 
In order to determine whether a person is "customarily 
engaged in an independently established" business or trade, the 
Utah Supreme Court has delineated several factors, noting the 
presence of all of them, is not necessary. New Sleep, 703 P.2d 
at 291. These factors include: holding oneself out to the 
public generally as engaged in a particular business; 
advertising one's services; having an established clientele; 
having a place of business; having a contractor's or business 
license; having special skills as a result of an apprenticeship 
period; and having a substantial investment in tools necessary 
2. In addition to deleting the "and" and inserting a comma at 
the end of subsection (A), the only other change to section 
35-4-22(j)(5) made in 1971 was to change an "in" to an "is." 
Both changes appear corrective in nature and neither had a 
substantive impact, leaving the meaning of the statute 
unchanged. 
870034-CA 4 
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to do the work. £fifi, &*&!.# New Sleep. 703 P.2d at 291; Superior 
Cablevision. 686 P.2d at 444; fiftinfiX* 681 P.2d at 1275-76. 
The following factors have been found unpersuaslve by the 
Utah Supreme Court in proving the existence of an independently 
established business or trade under subsection (C): part-time 
work contracted for "as needed11; flat rate or fixed price 
payment upon completion of the job; no set working hours; and no 
obligation to take the assignment. See Hew Sleep. 703 P.2d at 
290. 
In the instant case, the evidence supports the Commission's 
findings that the truck drivers were not Independently 
established in the truck driving business. Three of the four 
truck drivers who testified at the administrative hearing stated 
that when they contracted to haul hay for Ellison, they hauled 
exclusively for Ellison. None of the drivers owned their own 
trucks. They did not hold themselves out to the public as 
independent trucking concerns. They did not have a place of 
business or a clientele. 
Ellison relies on Barnev to support its position that the 
truck drivers were "customarily engaged in an independently 
established91 business of the same nature as the contract for 
service. However, Barney is clearly distinguishable. In 
Barney, drywall nailers and finishers pursued their skilled 
trade full-time after serving four-year apprenticeships. They 
maintained offices at their homes where they solicited and 
accepted business and kept books, records, and tools. Based on 
these characteristics, the Utah Supreme Court found these 
workers were independently established. 
Nielsen is more persuasive authority. In Nielsen, our 
supreme court held that the claimant, one of two truck drivers 
working for Nielsen, was ••employed" by Nielsen. The court found 
that because the claimant did not own the truck, nor have any 
ownership interest in Nielsen*s enterprise, and because the 
claimant did not receive profits from Nielsen9s enterprise, but 
instead performed services for wages, neither the claimant nor 
the two-driver team, as an entity, was subject to exclusion 
under the ABC test. Because of the factual similarities between 
the claimant-driver in Nielsen and the truck drivers here, we 
find Nielsen supportive of our conclusion that the truck drivers 
were not independently established. 
870034-CA 5 
Despite the fact that the written contracts designated the 
truck drivers as independent contractors, we find this 
designation ineffective. 6imilar characterisations were 
considered in Superior Cablcvltlon* 688 P.2d at 446, and uu&h 
Y» Board Of Review, 123 Utah 423, 424, 260 P;2d 744, 750 
(1953) • In each instance, the court held that such provisions 
"are ineffective in keeping an individual without the purview of 
the Employment Security Act when by his activity he brings 
himself within.*1 Ii&BLCh, 123 Utah at 434, 260 P.2d at 750. We 
look beyond the plain language of the contract to the actual 
status in which the parties are placed. Singer Sewing Machine 
Co. v> Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 174, 190, 134 p.2d 479, 485 
(Utah 1943). 
We find that there is substantial evidence to support the 
Commission's finding that the truck drivers were not 
independently established in the truck driving business, thereby 
satisfying subsection (C). 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Ellison contends that the evidence is insufficient to 
support the appeal referee's conclusion that all fifteen drivers 
working for Ellison during the period of the audit were 
"employed" by Ellison within the meaning of the Act when only 
four of the drivers actually testified. 
Interested parties are entitled to notice of proceedings 
which adequately informs them of the specific issues they must 
be prepared to meet. Travlor Bros, v. Overton, 736 P.2d 1048/ 
1050 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Ellison had sufficient notice of the 
issue to be adjudicated. The "Notice of Hearing," sent to 
Ellison well in advance of the hearing,, informed Ellison that 
the status of all drivers named in the audit was at issue. 
Specifically, this Notice stated: "[a] hearing will be held to 
determine whether individuals included in the auditor*s audit 
performed a service for a wage constituting employment." 
Again at the beginning of the hearing, the appeal referee 
said: 
[The] issue in this hearing is . . . 
whether individual[s] included in the 
auditor[f]s audit performed services for a 
wage constituting employment under the 
provisions of the Employment Security Act. 
Do both parties understand the issue? 
(Answers in the affirmative) 
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Moreover, an exhibit introduced into evidence without Ellison's 
••exception or comment" clearly identified the drivers whose 
status was the subject of the hearing. 
The Commission subpoenaed four of Ellison's fifteen 
drivers, whose testimony the Commission used to establish the 
relationship between all of the drivers and Ellison. Based upon 
the testimony of these four drivers, and absent any evidence they 
were somehow unique, the appeal referee concluded Ellison's 
fifteen drivers performed personal services for wages as defined 
by the Act* The appeal referee also concluded that the truck 
drivers were under Ellison's direction or control, and were not 
customarily engaged in independently established trades. If 
Ellison'6 relationship with the remaining eleven drivers was 
different from those of the four drivers who testified, the 
burden was on Ellison to produce those drivers, or otherwise show 
how their status differed. Ellison chose not to do so. There 
was no evidence before the appeal referee suggesting the 
remaining eleven drivers' relationship with Ellison was different 
from the one described by the witnesses. 
DUE PROCESS 
Ellison contends he was denied a fair hearing because the 
appeal referee examined the witnesses and received the 
Department's audit reports into evidence. Although we 
acknowledge the constitutional guarantee of due process may, in 
some circumstances, be violated when the same person presents the 
case for one party, cross-examines the witnesses of the other 
party, and then decides the case, Burhoe v. Whaland, 356 A.2d 
658, 659 (N.H. 1976), this case does not present such a 
circumstance. 
The documents about which Ellison complains were properly 
admitted pursuant to section 35-4-6(c)(J)(2) of the Unemployment 
Insurance Rules. Unemployment Insurance Rules, Utah Department 
of Employment Security § 35-4-6(c)(J)(2) (1986). This section 
provides in pertinent part that "[alny official records of the 
Department, including reports submitted in connection with the 
administration of the Employment Security Act may be included in 
the record.* Moreover, the appeal referee provided Ellison ample 
opportunity to object to the admission of this material. 
Ellison, however, made no objection and this issue cannot now be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & 
Sons, Inc. 682 P.2d 832, 839 (Utah 1984). 
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Our review of the record persuades us that Ellison received 
a fair hearing. The appeal referee afforded Ellison the 
opportunity to examine and cross-examine each witness and to 
present its case. The appeal referee did not intimidate the 
witnesses. Ellison, although he had a chance to do so, failed to 
object to the appeal referee's questioning of the witnesses. 
When one party is not represented by counsel, the appeal referee 
has an affirmative duty to elicit all relevant facts, including 
those favorable and unfavorable to the party that is not 
represented, fififi Vidal v. Harris. 637 F.2d 710, 713 (9th Cir. 
1981). Finally, there is no indication the appeal referee 
decided the case without considering evidence offered by 
Ellison. This case certainly does not rise to the level of the 
behavior condemned by the Utah Supreme Court in Bunnell v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 740 P.2d 1331 (Utah 1987). 
The decision of the Commission is affirmed. 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Michael R. Murphy, Judge 
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cd 
aad STEWART and DUsV 
TfMMKRMAN. J , narticipnte 
f t * STATS e* Utasw 
or* to explain one's 
76-6-312. 
U.CJL 1961, 
2. Criminal Lav 0*720(1). 1171J 
Prosecutor's comment, in prosecution 
lor jumping bail that defendant, when con-
fronted by bondsman, gave no explanation 
as to why be had jumped bail was not 
error, in light of fact that prosecutor was' 
simply commenting on one element neces-
sary to prove offense, namely, absence 
without good cause; in any event, any er-
ror was harmless, where defendant did not 
attack evidence and did not assign insuffici-
ency of evidence as error. U.CA. 1958, 
76-S-312. 
X. Criminal Law *»412.1(2) 
Bondsman who confronted defendant 
after defendant jumped bail had no duty to 
administer Miranda warning. U.S.CA. 
Const Amends 5, 14. 
waa convicted hi the Third 
District Conn. Safe Lake County, Ernest P. 
, J-. of jumping bail, and he appeal-
TW Ainu—i Court held that: (1) 
i who confronted defendant after 
i hail had no doty to ad-
aad (2) prose-
gave no explanation 
jumped bail waa not 
a, ILCJt* m t I K-+4U» 
Nancy Bergeson, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
David L» Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Earl P 
Doriua, Roger S. Blaylock, Ted Cannon, 
Aaet. Atty*. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
This is an appeal from a jury conviction 
for jumping bail * in the course of appel-
lant's previous trial for five other felonies. 
His bail frA*^ffnyn had him returned from 
Houston, Texas, about five months after 
his prior conviction. 
Appellant claims error in the summation 
to the jury when the prosecutor spoke to 
the bondsman's confrontation with appel-
lant in Houston. Appellant argues that his 
right to remain silent1 was violated when 
the prosecutor stated as follows: 
When [appellant] was arrested he gave 
no explanation as to what he was doing 
there, at least that is what [his bonds-
man] told us, and there is no evidence 
3* Under the fifth sad fourteenth 
ANDERSON v. INDUSTB 
C U « M * M F . 2 4 M 
here today that suggests that he had any 
legal justification for leaving. 
[1,2] The statement appears to have 
been little more than a paraphrasing of the 
information that was filed or the advice 
given by the trial judge to the jury as to 
what the charge was against appellant 
Jumping bail entails a concealment of 
whereabouts or an evasion or failure to 
explain one's absence. Referring to silence 
and therefore implying failure to explain is 
simply a comment on one of the elements 
necessary to prove absence without good 
cause or an explanation to justify it In 
any event, appellant did not attack the evi-
dence and did not assign insufficiency of 
the evidence as error. Under the generally 
accepted rule, any error such as that 
claimed by appellant here is harmless.1 
[3] There is nothing to indicate that ap-
pellant was coerced or pressured to explain 
anything or that he claimed refuge by de-
manding a Miranda warning. The con-
frontation by the bondsman was that of a 
citizen under a legal contract to assure the 
presence of his promisor in court at the 
time and place required. The cases cited 
by appellant, principally Doyle v. Ohio, 426 
U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 
(1976), are factually quite different Those 
cases stand for the proposition that a pub-
lic peace officer is charged with the duty to 
arrest and the duty to administer the Mi-
randa warning. In this case, the bonds-
man had no such duty. The comment as to 
appellant's silence in the presence of the 
bondsman has no comparable connotation 
as it did in the cases cited, particularly 
because of the material, believable evidence 
pointing to guilt 
We find no reversible error in the record. 
The verdict and sentence of the lower court 
are affirmed. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring in the result): 
I concur in the result, but not in the 
reasoning employed in the opinion of the 
Court I place my concurrence on the 
ground that the prosecutor's comment was 
;IAL COM^ OF UTAH Utah 1219 
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error, but I do not find it to have been 
prejudicial. The trial court promptly ad-
monished the jury to disregard the com-
ment, and he called their attention to his 
instruction to them that they should draw 
no adverse inference from the defendant's 
failure to testify. 
As to other matters discussed in the per 
curiam opinion, 1 express no opinion since I 
deem it unnecessary to do so. 
DURHAM, J., concurs in the concurring 
opinion of HOWE, J. 
(o fuVNUMMtlYltlM) 
Sarah Ann ANDERSON, Plaintiff, 
v. 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, Department of Employment Se-
curity, Barco of Utah, State Insurance 
Fund, and Second Injury Fund, De-
fendants. 
No, 19128. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 16, 1985. 
On review of worker's compensation 
order, the Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held 
that claimant was denied due process by 
issuance of reaffirmance order by adminis-
trative law judge who was counsel for sec-
ond injury fund when case was argued 
before judge who subsequently retired. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Constitutional Law *»301(4) 
Worker's compensation applicant was 
denied due process by issuance of order, 
which reaffirmed retired judge's order, by 
administrative law judge who was formerly 
s. The latest of our pronouncement! appears In Suu * H»kmr, Utah. 610 r\2d 15 (1914). 
1 2 M t te* i f f PACIFIC RSFOSTCR, U SEJU£S 
P f ! A l t « , 8&-1-S2L5*. 78-7-10* 
CJBuCJL CsMJbswk 4, 14. 
to the Industrial Commission for worker^ 
flnmnmsanon benefits, Barco's insuiir 
the State Insurance Fund, settled with an! 
After the operation, plaintiff § knee did 
not heal and she missed several months of 
•ork. A degenerative condiuon m her 
knee caused it to deteriorate, necessitating 
» o more operations. In 1980 she apphed 
to the Industrial Commisston for additional 
ownpfntshon. A medical panel found a 
17-5% permanent partial physical impair, 
•sent, which was caused partly by the n> 
duatnal accident, and partly by a pre-ex*V 
mg degenerative knee condition. Tbt pan-
el further found that after the first knee 
surgery, plaintiffs knee condition should 
have stahihied in three months, and that' 
any temporary total disability after three' 
months was due to the pre-existing degen-1 
eratjve knee condition Hie administrative 
law judge, Judge Foley, adopted the meoV 
cal panel's finding*, and ordered fPIT)[>f OSSr 
Uon for thirteen weeks for temporary total 
disability and found a 17.5% permanent^  
partial disability.
 T J 4 
The plaintiff objected to the findings aVj 
erroneous, and Judge Foley granted a fnr-J 
User hearing as allowed by statute.^ 
U.CJL, 1^53, section 3d-l-«2£3 (Supp.1 
1988). At the hearing, the plaintiff ao^ 
duced the testimony of her personal phya>] 
esan. Dr. McQueen. We are unable to re-jj 
view that testimony because the transenptj 
of thai hearing has been lost The plamaffj 
asserts that Dr McQueen testified that tbejj 
medical panel set plaintiff s jwnnanent'paK 
tad •npairmrnt rating too low and tmpropj 
eriy baaed *s finding of the tune required 
for ttahfltranon on normal recovery ratssv 
Section &-1-&L& provides that when'ajjj 
case is reopened and a further hearmfl 
head, the administrative law judge will earj 
ter a supplemental order. However, s iW J 
the second hearing Judge Foley neitherj 
reaffirmed nor modified his previous fiaM 
sags and order, nor did he enter a supploJ 
order, although counsel for plaint*** ] 
reqaeated haw to do so. 
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Judge Foley retired in July or August, 
1982, and was succeeded by Mr Timothy 
Allen, who had been counsel for the Second 
Injury Fund when this case was argued 
before Judge Foley. In January, 1983, 
Judge Allen issued an order reaffirming 
the previous order and dismissing plain-
tiffs objections to the court's findings 
Plaintiff sought review by the Industrial 
Commission, which declined to hear the 
matter. 
We need not consider all plaintiffs argu-
ments on appeal, since one is dispositive. 
[1-3] It was error lor Judge Allen to 
preside in this case, since he was formerly 
an attorney for one of the parties. One of 
the fundamental principles of due process 
is that all parties to s case are entitled to 
an unbiased, impartial judge. "A fair trial 
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of 
due process/' In re Murchison, 849 U.S. 
188, 186, 75 S.Ct 623, 625, 99 L.Ed.2d 942 
(1955). Fairness requires not only an ab-
sence of actual bias, but endeavors to pre-
vent even the possibility of unfairness. 
[4,5] This principle applies with as 
much force to administrative proceedings 
as it does to judicial trials. Gibson v. Ber-
ryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S.Ct 1689, 
1698, 86 L.£d.2d 488 (1973), Valx Conva-
lescent & Care Institution v. Industrial 
Commission, Utah, 649 P.2d 83, 87 (1982). 
Utah law requires a trial judge to disquali-
fy himself if he has previously appeared as 
an attorney in the case. U.C.A., 1953, sec-
tion 78-7-1(3). Although this statute does 
not literally apply to administrative pro-
ceedings, the principle it embodies is a use* 
ful and persuasive guide in reviewing ad-
ministrative proceedings. See 8 K. Davis, 
Administrative Law Treatise section 196 
(2d ed. 1980). 
In Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 806 P.2d 260 (D.C. 
Cir.1962), the court held that an SEC com-
missioner should not have participated in 
revocation proceedings, since he formerly 
had been responsible for initiating and con-
ducting the investigation of the company 
subject to revocation. The court stated: 
"The fundamental requirements of fair-
ness in the performance of [quasi-judicial] 
functions require at least that one who 
participates in a case on behalf of any 
party .. take no part in the decision of 
that case by any tribunal on which he may 
thereafter sit' " Id. at 264 (quoting Trans 
World Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics 
Board, 254 F.2d 90, 91 (D.C.Cir.1958)). 
[6] In other words, when a judge has 
previously been involved in a case as an 
attorney, there is no need to show actual 
prejudice. The law presumes prejudice in 
such circumstances. Judge Allen should 
have disqualified himself in this case. 
The defendants acknowledge that Judge 
Allen should not have acted in this case, 
but argue that the error was harmless be-
cause it did not affect the outcome in the 
case. Specifically, they argue that Judge 
Allen's written order merely memorialises 
what Judge Foley had already decided at 
the close of the second hearing. They as-
sert that Judge Foley ruled from the bench 
that the plaintiffs objections were dis-
missed and that the medical panel's find-
ings would not be modified. 
The record does not support the defend-
ants' factual assertions. As noted earlier, 
the transcript of the second heanng was 
lost, and hence the record does not reflect 
what Judge Foley said at the close of the 
second hearing. Although Judge Allen's 
order states that "it appears from the file 
that [plaintiffs] counsel was advised . . . at 
the termination of the heanng" that his 
objections were dismissed, we find nothing 
in the record to support this statement 
We therefore set aside the Commission's 
order and remand this case for submission 
of the issue to another administrative law 
judge. 
Reversed and remanded. 
HALL, CJ., and DURHAM, HOWE and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
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Brighton Bank to purchaae the itock for 
$30 par share, and an October 5,1981 offer 
from ono Mike Crowley to purchaae tho 
same for $40 par share. Appellant eon-
tends that tho arbitrators choae to ignore 
tho offer of $40 par aharo made by Crow-
fcy. 
(5) Generally, the court* are without 
authority to review the action of arbitra-
tors to correct error* or to substitute their 
conclusions for those of the arbitrators act» 
ing honestly and within the scope of their 
authority.* Only under statutorily desig-
nated grounds may a court vacate or set 
aside an arbitration award.1 
(€] In this ease, appellant asserts as the 
statutory grounds necessary to vacate the 
award that the arbitrators ignored the 
facts, msMpphfiri the law, and grossly vio-
lated the concepts of equity and fairness. 
However, the record does not bear out the 
sisertion. There is nothing to indicate that 
the arbitrators did not duly consider the 
evidence of Crowley's offer of $40 per 
share. Similarly, there is nothing to indi-
cate that the arbitrators did not also consid-
er the fact that the offer was made after 
the date fixed for valuation and, more im-
portantly, that the offer did not culminate 
in a sale. When weighed against all of the 
other evidence regarding value, the arbitra-
tors' determmsnon of market value ap-
pears to be fan* and reasonable, and we do 
not disturb A by substituting our judgment 
for that of the arbitrators.1 
17] Appellant's neat point on appeal is 
that the arbitration award was not timely, 
his contention being that the award was 
not made withm sixty days from the tune 
of the appointment of the arbitrators aa 
aundated by Utah Code Ann. § 78-31-8 
(1977). We do not address the merits of 
this contention because having permitted 
the prnreedingi to go forward to conelu* 
sun wtthout lodging a protest, appellant is 
m lanh 4*2. see. i s e> Jet set ffM m 447. 
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deemed to have waived any objection of 
timeliness.* 
Appellant's remaining point on appeal is 
that the order confirming the Award is not 
supported by the record. He asserts that 
the record contains only an unsigned copy 
of the arbitration agreement, that the 
award is impeachable on its face because it 
is undated and makes no reference to the 
dates the arbitrators were appointed, and 
that the award contains no language pur-
porting to make an award. 
Utah Code Ann. ft 78-81-20 (1977) re-
quired in part that the person moving for 
an order confirming an award file with the 
clerk the written arbitration agreement or 
a verified copy thereof, and the award nv 
self. The purpose of the statute was to 
provide a method by which an award could 
be reduced to judgment by summary pro-
ceedings.1* 
[8] In the absence of a factual dispute 
that a written arbitration agreement was 
entered into, that arbitration proceedings 
were had, and that an sward was made 
without complaint until it was clear that 
appellant had lost,11 the trial court appro-
priately concluded that the irregularities 
and informalities complained of did not con-
stitute grounds tor vacating the award 
within the contemplation of Utah Code 
Ann. ftft 7S-31-16 and -17 (1077). 
[0] In regard to the remaining conten-
tion that the language contained in the 
award does not purport to make an award, 
we disagree. Although designated as 
"Conclusions," the paragraphs contained 
therein plainly constitute the award made 
by the arbitration panel Particularly ex-
plicit is paragraph 5 thereof which reads sa 
follows: 
6. James D. Fake owes the Plan the 
sum of $17,230.48 including accrued in-
terest to June 15,1088. Interest accrues 
ft, Mk Apmrtmmu v. Martinet. 434 ?2d 704, 70* 
(Colo.CuApp.1982); R.R Bmn Comtr. Co. v. 
Mkldktmy AM$OG$H 139 Vt 200, 421 A2d 306, 
311-12 (I960); $m eav Utah Code Aaa. I 7e-
31a-10 (1917). 
in the amount of 16.67 per day there-
after. 
Affirmed. Costs to petitioner. 
STEWART, Associate CJL, and 
HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, 
JJ., concur. 
(o iuYMtMMIiVSTtM) 
Irwin G. BUNNELL, Plaintiff; 
• . 
The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION O 
UTAH, United States Steel Corp* 
ration/Geneva, and the Second Injur 
Fund, Defendants. 
No. 860196. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 28, 1987. 
Claimant was denied total disabih 
benefits after hearing before an admini 
trative judge law whose decision was u 
held by the Industrial Commission. Clau 
ant appealed. The Supreme Court, Di 
ham, J., held that (1) exclusion of testae 
ny concerning physician's statements < 
the basis of hearsay was improper, and i 
due process was denied where administi 
tive law judge's conduct was not imparts 
Reversed and remanded. 
Zimmerman, J., dissented and ffi 
opinion in which Hall, CJ., concurred. 
I. Constitutional Law *»318U) 
Due process demands new trial wl 
the appearance of unfairness is so pi 
that reasonable person would find the h< 
ing unfair. U.S.C.A. ConsUAmends. 5, 
1*. St Ommofuht, 10 Utah 442 at 449,131 
at 356. 
II. JL£ Bmn Comtr. Caw 421 AOd at 311 
1X32 Utah *4# PAOPIC UFOffTKH. 14 ft£RI%g 
erection erf archee to support a roof over 
es* of tfce open aeerta furnaces. Anarch 
earned by a crane struck plaintiff and he 
lost km footing on the catwalk. Fkunuff 
fefi about fifteen feet to the floor of the 
pad kit furnace, where he lay until co-work-
er* reached nun thirty to fifty seconds in* 
Usr. Be was taken to the Geneva riitrtmea 
ry and then to a hospital where he regained 
coasoooeneas five days later Plaintiffs 
gsjarsaj were grievous, he fractured his 
left wnst and several fingers on that hand, 
fractured hit ngnt *** fractured five ni* 
on has rujnt aide, auffereo a oppressed skull 
fracture, and was buna&d. In 1&55, puun-
off received an award of S36&25, wiuch 
repreeenteB a lo percent permanent partial 
dssabuiry ^Plaintiff, who was fifty at the 
pent of the amrtrni, eventually returned to 
eajsasMgrswsse't M 'wmf^mwm iimetnlr^ J 
> ^tssties- w&m* 
he *e4 awvwr f ^ r t 
*/ x^t After i>>^  nrrerfceiiir. r^rirrff had to drast> 
^ ^ M « e oaei +m*m*4 «**- ceJry redncb his physical activities and suf -
t't fared frequently from prieomonis for which 
r» smm Jar total dee- he was hofccetakuMi severe tunes. Puun-
tsff reeesvwd treauaeat for lung atknenta 
i a&* jsinun erf hwr by the sm» ftesa 10i8»to the present. He preesated 
t erf several tentative diagnoses, n> 
* epdeney and ennhyaeesa, that ..had 
R'S cawcessaew* wees a«sr~ been saade ever the yean. All of these 
were rejected after further ex* 
and treaooent Pkinttff asto 
by paaaajft We agree, eabwufiad a statement by a doctor speaal-
ratemdeaw; wefeweraeaad mag m poknrwintry medjaae, who examined 
atV de*offMlS6^siida«clud^«uahesuf-
obatrurtive pofenonary 
t s i l t t l a w ^ t for WBM^ there was a»ckarpreca> 
i as g caraeaaer by Gswsm aattag eaaae. The ni t era set said that the 
r boJarvad tfee accident; was a cojuribo-
a pkstdxff« 
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{1} It is IT > nere have been cases 
ID which *• • * &» ha# jwesented more 
©pmpeliix^ *t*u* M a^eevej every per-
son who wrings & --^' *o s court or at a 
hearing held btfo-t an administrative agen-
cy has a due process right to receive a fair 
tn* n ~Qvi of a fair tribunal Anderson 
v. yjw * mmususn, 696 PJ2d 1219, 
1221 (Utah iaSfc). "Fairness requires not 
only an absence of actual bus, but endeav-
ors to prevent even the possibility of un-
fairness." M at xtmx in reviewing the 
Commission's r on i&ruftutuuonai 
challenge**, this *P*>bes * correction* 
oi-erroi etanlam *«h no deference to the 
Commission's expertise Vt&h Depart-
ment of Administrative Service* * }*v -
Service Commission, 668 P.2d #o 
(Utah 1988). Our review of th# -
••wsyiaiT li w&mm 
it] Plaintiff attempted to offer th* 
statements of treating physicians (now un-
available ss witnesses) concerning the dam-
age caused by the accident, but the adm&-
istrative law judge rejected the statements 
m hearsay. There was no- reason for the 
rejection of the statements on that basis'. 
Utah Code Ann § 8o-l-S8 (1974) reads: 
"Neither the commission nor its hearing 
officers shall be bound by the usual com-
mon-law or statutory rules of evidence." 
See also Utah EJhnd. 1101 (Rules of Evi-
dent 4^*/ to all actions ana proceedings 
in c with certain enumerated excep-
tion*. ** have repeatedly held that the 
near»»v mie aoes not apply in aomuustra-
tive hearings See, «.#, Schmidt v Indust-
rial Commission, 61? P Zd e»Z, 006 (i ts* 
iftft), Gardnm % Edward Quran* 
801 
phuntiirs Witnesses were inhibited and in-
timidated by the Judge's conduct, and felt 
defensive and hesitant to testify, the judge 
interfered with puunuffs counsel'! ability 
to make a record and argue the evidence, 
and the judge gave tne jtopearance of hav-
ing decided tue case without even consider-
ing the medical records. The dissent mini-
mixes this behavior as "Impatience" and a 
lack of "temperate neutrality/' We think 
the record reflects a far more serious sys-
tematic failure to conduct a fair hearing. 
L Th^ diMcni dcrkka thii pnnc^U *» * "general 
hortatory Mstcmmf and say* mat Andtr$<m It 
not helpful in the resolution of thit caas. We 
disagree. We do not think mat due process 
requires procedures dial endeavor to »v< 
t m unfainies* only in caeet" 
the Judajr aiao acted as counsel for c 
parte /*** «uuaUoo in **d$n<m), 
dHak thai eue |eoceas eetnanda a ^ 
of unf aimest a m plm£i 
tumum ujr pnyaiuajs ueatmg ner busoandL 
We have examinee the medical records 
available to tne administrative law ptdg9 
and think it unfair to the p i^n* of error for 
the judge t£ have rejected hearsay supple-
mentation of those records Man) of toe 
records concerning the 196? *ccidea re-
mained in the control of Ge«ieva Steel. The 
records are self<ontrajductory - ^f obvious* 
)y incomplete For examp'- ^e m$&~£> 
record summary prepared b> * *. 
va'fi doctors for considersUo? 
trial panel m 1955 placed the b 
that we are left with the abiding uiap A**.^ %hm 
a reaaonahk person would find Htm h®*mt$* 
unfair It is perhaps instructive tha* ~ 
ifirauve law judge whose condur 
Uon in Andsrum was also the }u# 
We fear die masoning employee 
will encourage the lmpr«»»ior u-
•iona are merely <%Mi*iory~ -? mi be 
enforced. 
TT| tut *** w *ACOK mm&ttM. u axxasa 
o 
m 
<D 
bO 
05 
(X. 
X 
tiffs wilt frequenter incorporated in her 
mpnmM statements like "I don't know 
whether this would he allowed k the 
record or not," *?a>a I oat of tine," and 
tt^tafa hod for the record, but if a the 
troth." Further, the witness eeome to 
have reenuied her totthnony to matters 
that ahe thought the ednimistratrre law 
jodge would find acceptahle after ahe had 
heem told hy her counsel that ahe could not 
tall what a treating physician had said. 
Toe arimmistrative law judge was also 
iniokaaiit of counsel's argument on behalf 
ofphuotiff. He refused to hates to dosing 
argument. More shockingly, when plain-
tiffs osuossl offered argument messing 
toe evidence before the admission of the 
modirsl records on which the adminietra-
twe law judge purportedly made his deci-
sion, the adnumstrathre law judge told 
plaintiffs counsel to save the argument tar 
rehearing, mdrafing that he had already 
dadoed to hold against plaintiff without 
even cramming the medical records. 
In abort, the adminietratnre Isw judge's 
conduct so far diverged from that which 
would be caponed from an impartial judge 
that we agree with plaintiff that his right 
to due protect was violated. 
STEWART, Associate CJ., and 
HOWE, J„ concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (dissenting): 
I agree with the majority that the admin-
istrative law judge plainly erred in exclud-
ing evidence in reliance on the hearsay 
rule. We have held explicitly that a strict 
•ppbrstinrt of the rules of evidence it inap-
propriate in such has ringi. Eg*, Gardner 
a Edward Gardner Plumbing 4b Heating, 
inc . 4*8 PJd 678, 681-82 (Utah 19841. 1 
also think the testimony excluded was rale-
vent to tan wanes put before htm. How-
over, I cannot conclude that the erroneous 
STrmsiea of the evidence was harmful. 
Thaw was ample evidence before the ed-
swnistrativc lew judge to support his ruling 
that plaintiff hod failed to show a causal 
mnasrtinn between the accident and the 
hw*prohlae*s. 5a* «*t,Hi&ins% Jndur 
BUNNELL v. INDUSTRIAL COM*N OP UTAH 
O U M M S fid M i l (Utek IfST) 
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trial Commission, 700 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah 
1985); Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet 
Management, 725 P.2d 1828 (Utah 1986). 
It is not for this Court to redetermine the 
weight of the evidence and the credibility 
of the witnesses. E.g., Stoker v. Industri-
al Commission, 61 Utah 11, 16, 209 P. 880, 
882 (1922). Given the decision of the ad-
ministrative law judge on the conflicting 
evidence, 1 cannot ssy that had the errone-
ously excluded evidence been admitted, it 
would have raised s substantial likelihood 
of an outcome more favorable to the claim-
ant MatHngly v. Charnes, 700 P.2d 927, 
929 (Colo.App.1985) (administrative agen-
cy's decision will not be reversed unless 
substantial rights of the party are preju-
diced); In re Certificate of Need Applica-
tion, 284 Kan. 802, 805-06, 676 P.2d 107, 
110 (1984) (administrative agency's error 
which does not prejudice substantial rights 
of the party will not be reversed); see also 
Gardner v. Edward Gardner Plumbing & 
Heating, Inc., 698 P.2d at 682 (administra-
tive law judge's exclusion of testimony jus-
tified remand when the judge effectively 
precluded plaintiff from meeting the evi-
dence against him); cf. State v. Hackford, 
66 Utah Adv.Rep. 9,11 n. 1 (April 22,1987); 
see State v. Knight, 784 P.2d 918, 919-21 
(Utah 1987) (standard of review defined); 
Utah R.Evid. 108; Utah R.Civ.P. 61; Utah 
R.Cnm.P. 80; Utah Code Ann. ft 77-85-80 
(1982). Therefore, I would affirm on the 
causation issue.1 
As for the majority's holding that the 
proceedings before the administrative lsw 
judge were conducted in a manner that 
made them so unfair as to deny the claim-
ant due process of lsw under article I, 
section 7 of the Utah Constitution, I dis-
sent Certainly, the administrative law 
judge erred in excluding the hearsay evi-
dence. To my knowledge, erroneous rul-
ings slone are not sufficient to show the 
bias or prejudice required to disqualify s 
judge. State ex rel Miller v. Richardson, 
229 Kan. 284, 288, 628 P.2d 1817, 1822 
(1981) (construing state statutory lsw); see 
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 8, ft C. 
i. Apparently tht majority asTest thst tht tvi* 
deatiery ruling alone does not warrant reversal, 
i it reaches for tht eoasutuuooal argument 
In the present action, the administrative 
law judge did more than rule erroneously. 
He also displayed impatience with the 
claimant's witnesses and did not manifest 
the temperate neutrality that I would hope 
is the general rule in trial oourta and ad-
ministrative tribunals. However, I cannot 
agree that his divergence from good prac-
tice was so extreme or affected the pro-
ceedings, so profoundly that we can say 
that the claimant was denied due process 
under the state constitution. 
The majority cites Anderson v. Industri-
al Commission, 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 
1985), as authority for the proposition that 
"[f)airness requires not only an absence of 
actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even 
the possibility of unfairness." This gener-
sl hortatory statement is correct How* 
ever, it does not assist in deciding the 
present case. In Anderson, we held that 
principles of fairness required that an ad-
ministrative law judge be disqualified from 
a case when he or she previously had ap-
peared as an attorney for one side. The 
statute we applied in reaching this conclu-
sion does not require any showing of actual 
prejudice, but mandates automatic disquali-
fication when a judge has acted as an attor-
ney for either party in the action. Utah 
Code Ann. ft 78-7-1(8) (1977). We aaw no 
reason why this statutory requirement 
should not be extended under the banner of 
due process to administrative law judges. 
Thst ruling has no application in the 
present action. Moreover, there is no state 
statute, rule, or provision of the Code of 
Judicial Conduct that condemns what oc-
curred here. The closest provision is that 
which requires that judges must disqualify 
themselves when they are actually biased 
or prejudiced against a party or an attor-
ney. See Utah R.Civ.P. 68(b). Due pro-
cess most certainly requires that a similar 
rule apply in an administrative setting. 
See, e.g., Vali Convalescent & Care Insti-
tution v. Industrial Commission, 649 
P.2d 88, 86-87 (Utah 1982). However, the 
present fscts do not rise to that leveL 
at s foundation for overturning the result be-
low. 
12M Dot Urn PACIFIC KEFOKTER. 24 8EUES 
fee soi act Pom? R. Fishier, J„ summarily dismissed 
ta toe m> parent's claim. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
k n oaol Sm Cost CJ., held that action was barred by four* 
S, ft A& His year statute of repose. 
eete^pmydmqaalnV Affirmed. 
or ossy ta« ckssmot 
Sm Stmts WLLogmm.ZK KM*. 
•a* P.M T7s\ 784 os (Meek ijaBetotieo of artinot e^(( l) 
n t a S i damage resulting from surgery performed 
s e t years earner was barred by four-year 
me smajtaj semi Id be rs Minos statute of repose, even though alleged neg-
peosds toat aie seed today to thence was discovered mas than two years 
tarn m s^esedssg m the asset of ^fat „&
 w a i Q^ U.CJL1^ 63, 78-14-
teeeme a smaoai* attack upon ^ 
^ S M i M j s y i i m t s f i i i e i Q^ ^
 BichmiJ^ ^ L ^ Q^ f o r 
ssm steal em OBJ gwee OBJ. okmtiff sod appellant. 
HAIJ CJ, «—— m the *• Anthony Eyre, Salt Lake City, for 
i a* IlMnfEBMAM. J. orfsodsot and reepoodent. 
HAIJ, Chief Justice: 
of dismissal of his claim for n^ MJHtti mal-
practice. The only viable issue on appeal is 
whether the trial court correctly concluded 
that plaintiffs claim was barred by the 
four-year statute of repose contained in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14*4 (1987).1 
la May 1S7S, defendant performed cor-
rective surgery on plaintiffs ankle necessi-
tated by an injury sustained in an automo-
bueaccme&L On February 19,1982, plain-
tiff alkgedly dmootered that the surgery 
hod been negligently performed and com-
lis lawsuit with the filing of a 
so December 28, 1S82. 
On appeal, plaintiff advances the same 
protected to the trial court He 
his complaint was timely 
filed withm two yean of the date his injury 
Tot was docori red, and m reliance upon our 
m Foil a BalUnger* he contends 
aedraei ibcm. £ g , Tepik v. Tkurber. 
J* TM 1101. 1101 (Utah 19S7); Jwfcy Mfg. 
Cm*, K Dmpm Bmtk * Tnm. 717 tM 1341, 
U47(Uebltte>. 
2. eftl fJd 144 (Utah ItTi). 
that his claim should not have been extin-
guished before it was discovered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (1987) (effec-
tive April 1, 1976) provides, in pertinent 
part* 
(1) No malpractice action against a 
health care provider may be brought un-
less it is commenced within two years 
after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or 
through the use of reasonable diligence 
should have discovered the injury, which-
ever first occurs, but not to exceed four 
yean after the date of the alleged act, 
omission, neglect or occurrence 
(2) The provisions of this section shall 
apply to all persons, regardless of ... 
legal disability under ft 78-12-86 or any 
other provision of the law, and shall ap-
ply retroactively to all persons, partner-
ships, associations and corporations and 
to all health care providers and to all 
malpractice actions against health care 
providers based upon alleged personal 
injuries which occurred prior to the effec-
tive date of this act; provided, however, 
that any action which under former law 
could have been commenced after the 
effective date of this act may be com-
menced only within the unelapsed portion 
of time allowed under former law; but 
any action which under former law could 
have been commenced more than four 
years after the effective date of this act 
may be commenced only within four 
yean after the effective date of this act 
(Emphasis added.) 
The trial court appropriately observed 
that the foregoing statute is stated in two 
parts. It is not only a statute of limitation; 
it is also a statute of repose. The statute 
begins to run from the time an injured 
person knows or should know that he has 
suffered an injury.1 But in any event, the 
statute requires that an action be com-
menced within four years after the date of 
the incident which caused the injury. 
Plaintiffs reliance upon Foil is mis-
placed. In that case, the cause of action 
was commenced within the four-year stat-
i . Id. at 14S0. 
MADDOCKS v. SALT LAKE CITY CORP. 
C1UM74S HA 1117 (Uuk I9S7) Utah 1337 
ute of repose, and the Court was not called 
upon to address the issue raised in this 
case. 
Plaintiffs cause of action is barred by 
the four-year statute of repose. The sum-
mary judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. 
STEWART, Associate CJ., and 
HOWE, DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, 
JJ., concur. 
<([ps l*etisvnM> * * w -
Preston MADDOCKS, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, et 
al., Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 19916. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 6, 1987. 
Arrestee brought civil rights and negli-
gence action against city and throe police 
officers seeking to recover damages for 
injuries sustained when he was allegedly 
wrongfully arrested and unlawfully beaten 
by one officer. The Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, David B. Dee, J., grant-
ed summary judgment to defendants, and 
appeal was taken. The Supreme Court, 
Durham, J., held that (1) deprivation of 
civil rights action was governed by four* 
year statute of limitations for persona] in-
juries, not by two-year statute of limita-
tions for actions brought against sheriffs 
and officers for liability incurred through 
omission of official duty; (2) arrestee's ac-
tion against police officers for negligence 
in failing to intervene in beating by third 
police officer was barred by statute pre-
cluding persona] liability of government 
employee for acts or omissions occurring 
740PJO-*) 
Before the Industrial Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
LEGAL SECTION 
In the matter of the 
Claim of: 
ELLISON, INC. 4-128112-0 
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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
Hearing conducted in the offices of the Job 
Service Center, 1234 South Main, Salt Lake City, 
Utah on October 6, 1986 at 10:10 a.m.; same being 
pursuant to Notice of the Administrative Law Judge 
of the Department of Employment Security of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Before the HON. KENNETH A. MAJOR 
Administrative Law Judge 
APPEARANCES: 
Drew Christensen, Field Auditor 
Department of Employment Security 
For Ellison Inc.: 
David Ellison, President 
Dexter Anderson - Attorney 
WITNESSES: (Testifying by Telephone) 
Don Bennett 
Paul Boles 
Roger Chappell 
Curt Wilcox 
Reported by Jeanie Murphy 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: This 1$ a hearing 1n the matter of 
Ellison, Inc. employer no. 4-128112-0 on October 6, 1986 at 10:10 a.m. 
The hearing 1s being held 1n the Salt Lake Job Service Office by 
Kenneth Major, Administrative Law Judge, 
The employer filed an appeal on May 23, 1986 to the audit determination 
dated May 23, 1986. 
Appearances are made by Field Auditor Drew Christensen with the Department 
Dave Ell 1 son for the employer and Dexter Anderson, attorney 1s representing 
the employer. Witnesses have been arranged to testify phone and they are 
Don Bennett, Paul Bowles, Roger Chappel and K1rk Wilcox. 
At Issue 1n this hearing 1s to determine whether Individual Included 1n the 
auditors audit performed the services for a wage constituting employment 
under the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
Do both parties understand the Issue? (Answers 1n the affirmative) 
IE Alright. I have here some documents which I would H k e to briefly review 
and entervlnto the record. They will be entered into the record subject 
to comment or exception that will come forth during the testimony. 
Exhibit #1 is in two parts labeled la and lb. This is a status determination 
issued by Mr. Christensen, May 23, 1986, giving the basis for his audit 
determination which held various individuals in employment. This is unsigned, 
is this in fact your determination Mr. Christensen? 
ISTENSEN Yes. 
GE Exhibi t #2 i s a Notice of Appeal, f i l e d by the employer May 23, 1986, appealing 
the Department's decision. This is signed by David L. Ellison. Mr. Ellison 
is that your signature? 
.ISON Yes. 
)GE Exhibit #3 is a Schedule of Unreported Wages. This gives a list of the individ-
uals performing services and the amounts the auditor determined to be wages. 
This breaks it down per quarter for 1984 and 1985. Is that your signature on 
that document Mr. Christensen? 
RISTENSEN Yes 
DGE Exhibit #4 is in two parts labeled 4a and 4b. This is the auditor's audit 
report listing the results of his findings showing total contributions owing 
in the amount $7,040.20, covering the years 1984 and 1985, plus additional 
interest and penalties. The reverse side is audit information concerning the 
records audited and the reasons for the differences. Is this your signature 
there Mr. Christensen? 
IRISTENSEN Yes. 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
ANDERSON 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
ELLISON 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
ELLISON 
JUDGE 
ELLISON 
JUDGE 
ANDERSON 
JUDGE 
Exhibit #5 1s fevtral sheets labeled SA through 5F. These are the auditor's 
worksheets for each one of the years audited. Exhibit #6 1s the Status 
Reported completed by the Department - this 1s per status letter. Is that 
your Initials there Mr. Chrlstensen? 
Yes. 
Exhibit 
Excuse me, can I look at that? 
Exhibit #7 1s a wage schedule. A break down of payments for various trips 
which the drivers might take for Ellison and also a breakdown for a particular 
service that may be performed by the drivers. Mr. Chrlstensen* can you tell 
me what Exhibit 8 through 8d might be? 
These were given to me before I ever contacted Mr. Ellison. They are from 
the Motor Vehicle Department, listing of registrations of various vehicles 
listed either Mr. Ellison or Ellison, Inc. 
They are labeled 8a through 8d. Exhibit #9 1s in three parts labeled 9a throu 
9c, this is the Independent Contractor Agreement. It does not have any 
particular contractor's name on it, however it bears the signature of David 
Ellison. I assume this is a sample contract that is used? 
That was filled out, these auditors took the names offwith liquid paper. 
I wiped out the names so -
Alright, this is a sample contract -
No it's a legitimate contract. 
Is that your signature on that document? 
Yes. 
Exhibit #10a and 10b is a subpoena issued to David Ellison as President of 
Ellison, Inc. and 10b is Return of Service that this subpoena was served to 
Mr. Ellison. Exhibit 11 is two parts 11a and lib. This is a statement by 
claimant of work and wages filed by Donald K. Bennett, a driver who had 
contracted with Ellison, lib is a list of payments he received. 
I will receive those into the record, 1 through lib, subject to comment or 
exception. Before we proceed further gentlemen, do any of you need to take a 
few moments to further look over these documents? 
...FOR JUST A MINUTE 
Alright. Also did the employer and employer representative receive a brochun 
entitled "Unemployment Insurance Appeals Information"? 
ANDERSON I am sorry would you repeat that? 
nnAr> 
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E Did you receive a small leaflet explaining the appeal hearing and your 
appeal rights? 
:RS0N I haven't seen that. 
[SON I don't recall having... 
5E That 1s generally sent out, you should have receive that with your notice. 
In the event that 1t was not received, let me mention a couple of Items that 
are Important for you to understand. This will be the only hearing which any 
evidence or testimony may be submitted. Should either party, the Department 
or yourself, desire to appeal the decision that will be rendered as a result 
of this hearing, that appeal would be made to The Board of Review. There is 
also a level of appeal from The Board of Review, The Supreme Court. The 
reason why this 1s the only hearing 1s that The Board of Review and The Supreme 
Court do not hold hearings as we are, they are looking at a transcript of this 
recording, in addition to any evidence that 1s entered Into the record as ex-
hibits and from those sources they would issue their decision. Is that under-
stood by both parties? 
ERSON Yes. 
iGE Okay. Counsel, I will give you a few more moments to look over those documents 
and we will get under way. While you are doing that I will get ahold of the 
well, we will get into Mr. Christensen's testimony before we get into the other 
witnesses. 
)ERS0N I think we are ready. 
)6E Alright. OATH GIVEN TO MR. CHRISTENSEN. Answered in the affirmative. 
Please state your name and position with the Department? 
USTENSEN Name is Drew Christensen, I am a Field Auditor with Job Service. 
)GE Thank you Mr. Christensen. Would you begin by explaining the basis of your 
investigation into Ellison. 
RISTENSEN. I was given an assignment to contact Mr. Ellison on possible employment that 
was not being reported. The source, I was told, was an anonymous tip. I 
contacted Mr. Ellison. He then said that to see the records I would have 
to subpoena him because he was not really happy with the concept of me doing 
an audit on the records. So I got a subpoena and I went through the records 
at that time. 
DGE What records did you audit? 
IRISTENSEN He brought in, basically, work sheets that show the amounts paid, the trips 
that each of the individuals made and that was broke down by quarters. 
IDGE Continue. 
IRISTENSEN Those were the main records that he brought in. There were (?) checks 
that did cover the whole time period, but there were some checks that were 
hmnnht in that were mainly the worksheets of the individuals. 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
Did you have iccesi to my check register or Journelt, ledgers? 
No, there really was not a register or check stubs or such. 
I t was primarily from the worksheets? 
Right. 
What type of services did you find being performed? 
The Individuals were taking a truck, mainly from the Fillmore area, I 
understand, not always, but from a farm area, hauling hay and I think 1t was 
to the area around Haywood, California. I am not positive on that. Dellveri 
the hay down there and then, 1n most cases, back hauling something from the 
L.A. area to Salt Lake or someplace 1n Utah or maybe even Nevada. 
How were these drivers being paid? 
They were paid by a schedule - a certain amount for whereever the trip was 
from to where 1t was they were to drop off the load. 
How did you obtain that information? 
From this sheet. 
Who furnished you the sheet? 
Mr. Ellison. 
What elements of control did you find, Mr. Christensen? 
Basically the element of control was the ownership of the trucks. 
Do you want to expound upon that? 
The trucks belonged to either Mr. Ellison or Ellison, Inc. 
...Why does that exhibit control? 
Basically from Exhibit 8 a,b,c and d - who the trucks belonged to. 
Why did you determine that exhibited control? 
Because the ownership of the truck, who owns that, is the one who has control. 
Any other indicators of control? 
None, just the.. 
Did youmakean investigation to determine whether any of these individuals 
were independently established? 
I sent out Form II to each of them, none of them were returned. 
What is a Form II? 
A / > Mf\ 
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ISTENSEN 
GE 
IISTENSEN 
IGE 
tISTENSEN 
)GE 
tISTENSEN 
)GE 
RISTENSEN 
DGE 
RISTENSEN 
DGE 
RISTENSEN 
DGE 
RISTENSEN 
DGE 
IRISTENSEN 
IDGE 
IRISTENSEN 
JDGE 
«ISTENSEN 
JDGE 
unTCTCMCCM 
It 1s I questionnaire that was mailed out asking the Individuals their 
concept, whether they were an employee or an Independent. 
How many did you send out? None of these were returned? 
I think 1t was eight of them. 
Who did you send them to? 
I have the names here - Dan Camer, Mike Stevens, Max Bishop, Dave Johnson, 
Don Bennett, Paul Bole, I am not sure 1f that 1s pronounced right, Roger 
Chappel, Keith Hazelton and Ralph Taylor. 
Did you have occasion to talk with any of these drivers? 
No, none of them. I talked to two of their wives. I tried to contact 
them by phone. 
What information did you learn from the wives? 
The wives were not able to furnish me with any information. They were not 
sure what the relationship was with the business. 
I refer you to what has been labeled exhibit #9, Mr. Christensen. This is 
the Independent Contractor Agreement. Are you familiar with this document? 
I have read through it once, is all. 
Did you find in the records such documents being signed by the drivers? 
There were three separate copies - I can't remember which names were on 
them. We made a copy of the one and then whited out the name. 
So you did see three such documents that driver's signatures? 
Um-hum. I can't tell you which ones they were now. 
On reviewing that document, Mr. Christensen, what is your opinion of that 
document? 
Well, I think that it is set up to set them up as an independent contractor, 
but I don't think it really applies because the individuals don't own the 
trucks and thus do not have a business of their own. 
Why is the ownership of the truck important? 
It shows control. 
Anything else concerning this contract here. 
No. 
The individuals you include here on your audit, were all those drivers? 
Ac T imHorctanH. thev were all drivers. The worksheets indicate that they 
JUDGE Anything further, Mr. ChHitenten? Counsellor, do you have tome questions 
you would like to ask? 
ANDERSON Yes. Mr. Chrlstensen, I don't want to get started off on the wrong foot, but 
think that you remember that we did have some conversation about the posslbll 
that one of Dave's competitors may have Instigated the Investigation. You 
mentioned that you had been given the assignment - could you elaborate on 
that as to who gave you the assignment and 
The assignment was assigned by my Immediate supervisor, Don Avery. 
What was his name? 
Don Avery. 
Would you have any Information as to how he came to be Interested 1n 
Ellison, Inc.? 
From what he told me, he had received the assignment from his supervisor 
Dean Kimber who had been told that there was an anonymous tip. 
Who was his supervisor, then? 
Dean Kimber. 
Would you have any idea who that anonymous tipper was? 
I have no idea. 
Based on your knowledge of the procedures in the office, would there be any 
record of that? You are calling i t an anonymous tipper, I don't know, I am 
just trying to find out would there be any record of that telephone call? 
I am not aware of i t . 
Are you aware of any procedures that might disclose the name of that person? 
No I am not. Alot of times they will just call and refuse to give their 
name. 
Are you aware of any way the name of that person might be revealed? 
I am not aware of any. 
If this a fairly common thing to happen in the Department, to act on 
anonymous tips? 
Yes, I get about three a year where someone will call my line and I ask 
them for a name and they say no - I write down the information and turn it 
over to my supervisor and let him decide whether it should be acted upon 
and in most cases it is. 
ANDERSON You did not take this call? 
ANDERSON Do you know who did? 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
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ISTENSEN No I don't. 
:RS0N Would there be any record of that? 
ISTENSEN Unless Mr. Mmbtr has 1tt I don't know. 
ERSON Okay, lets move on. Did you, 1n your Investigation, find any regular route 
that any of these individuals classified as drivers, followed on a routine 
basis? 
ISTENSEN My understanding was that there were various routes, so there was no set -
ERSON A regular route like a UPS delivery man might follow, a certain map or road 
every day and stop at certain places? 
ISTENSEN There was no Indication of this kind of a route. When you look at the 
schedule of how much they are paid from one point to another, that was what 
they were paid and apparently they would go the shortest route to save time 
and whatever. There was not a set route that they had to go as I understand. 
They had to go from point A to 
ERSON ...Depending on where they picked up and where they delivered was 
lISTENSEN They would just go the shortest route, as far as I know. 
»ERS0N Did you find any schedules, I will use that word, any schedules that any 
driver or each driver had to follow? 
[ISTENSEN Do you mean time schedule? 
)ERS0N Yes. 
USTENSEN No, there was not a set time on when the trips went. They were random, 
even on days. 
JERSON Were there any hourly records kept. In other words, the number of hours a 
person might have been required to drive, or anything of that nature? 
USTENSEN I did not see anything as far as required hours, to drive. Only that they 
made the trip from point A to point B. 
3ERS0N Did you find any kind of a work schedule. When any particular individual 
was required to report to work or when his time off was. 
RISTENSEN No, there was no schedule of that kind. 
DERSON The pay that each driver received then, was strictly based on the - exhibit 
#7, wage schedule -but the schedule just simply show how much a person was 
paid to take a truck from point A to point B. 
RISTENSEN That's the way they were paid. 
DERSON Was there any indication that any of all of these drivers worked on a full 
time basis, what we would consider a full time basis? Were any of them part-
time or irregular? 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
ANDERSON 
CHRISTENSEN 
Some, 1t showed they worked every week, driving. Others maybe with one 
trip a month. I did not make a detailed 11st of that type of who made 
trips weekly and who made only one trip a month. 
Would that vary with each Individual driver. One driver might drive all 
week and the next week he might not drive at all and come back the following 
week and drive a trip, or something of that nature? 
Yes. This could happen. Usually those that worked every week, 1t was 
consistent every week and those that maybe once a month, that was 1t, once 
a month. 
Maybe I am kind of duplicating myself, but I think 1t 1s Important. Were 
there any Indications that there were set times to pick up particular loads 
are set times to deliver loads? 
There was not. 
Would you explain to me what ownership of the truck has to do with the 
element of control? 
The one that owns the truck decides if that truck is going to move any place. 
He is the one that decides who can make that trip or what driver can drive 
that trip. 
Was there any indication that the drivers had any control over that. About 
when a truck might leave or when it might come back. What it might pick 
up for a load? 
There was no indication +if the drivers had any - it seemed they were con-
tacted that there was such a load - would they be interested. They would the 
accept it and go by the time schedule for that load, but each load would 
vary as to the time schedule. 
You didn't find any employees handbooks or policy or any written policy that 
controlled their responsibilities as a driver/ Did you find anything like 
that? 
No, I didn't. 
You said you spoke to a couple of the wives, and you seemed to indicate 
that they didn't seem to know what the status of their husband was. Is that 
what you said? 
Yes. 
Was there any indication as to why they were confused about that? 
They really said that they just didn't know how - they knew their husbands 
drove trucks for Mr. Ellison but they didn't know what the relationship was 
and I told them that I needed to have them and call me and talk to me and I 
asked for a time that I could catch them. We were never able to catch them 
on the phone and they never returned the informational requests that were 
mailed to them. 
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:RS0N The three copies of the Independent Contractor Agreement that you did have, 
they were or they have been signed by drivers, but you whlted out the names 
so you didn't know who they were. 
ISTENSEN Yes, that 1s true. 
ERSON As far as you could see, they were executed agreements? 
ISTENSEN Yes 
ERSON Did you, were those three just samples then or were they ? 
ISTENSEN Yes they were samples. I had asked for a copy of 1t and the reason for 
whiting out was basically keep anonymous who the Individual was. 
ERSON You didn't particularly then look for a contractor's agreement for each of 
these individuals that you have mentioned? 
ISTENSEN No, I did not. 
'ERSON You don't know whether one exists or whether it doesn't? 
[ISTENSEN Not for all of them no. But there some contracts for some of these 
individuals. 
IERS0N When you first initiated this investigation, did you ask for Mr. Ellison then 
what his relationship with the drivers were? 
USTENSEN Yes 
JERSON What did he tell you? 
USTENSEN He said that they were contract labor, that they were able to accept or reject-
any load driving his trucks that they wanted to. He also said that they were 
free to drive for any other truck driver that wanted their services. 
)ERS0N Did you find any instances of that, where a driver might drive one load for 
Ellison, Inc. and another load for some other trucker? 
USTENSEN No. Mainly because I never looked at any other trucking business. 
3ERS0N I don't believe that I have any other questions. 
DGE Mr. Christensen, do you have anything further to say? 
RISTENSEN No. 
DGE Alright, let's get ahold of our first witness then. Don Bennett. 
Mr. Bennett? This is Judge Major - we are ready for your testimony. I am 
going to place you on a speaker phone. Mr. Bennett can you hear me? 
NNETT Yes. 
DGE I have with me Drew Christensen, an auditor for the Department. I have Dexter 
Anderson, a lawyer representing Ellison, Inc. and Mr. Dave Ellison is also 
present. Did you receive some documents stamped as exhibits? 
BENNETT Yts, I did 
JUDGE Do you have those with you? OATH GIVEN AND ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. 
Would you state your name and address for the record 
BENENTT Donald K. Bennett, p.o. Box 334, Orangevllle, Utah. 
JUDGE Thank you. What 1s your occupation? 
BENNETT Heavy Equipment operator and truck driver. 
JUDGE During 1985, did you contract with Ellison to perform a truck driving service 
BENNETT Yeh, I went to work for him drive truck and haul hay from Delta to L.A. and 
other flatbed material back, 
JUDGE How did you go about obtaining this contract with Mr. Ellison? 
BENNETT Well, I called him up and he was looking for a driver and a couple of weeks 
after he called me and asked me to go to work. We met 1n a cafe in Fillmore 
to talk about the job and he told me (intelligible)...how much I would be 
making. He did tell me that I would be paying the taxes because it was a 
contract and I would have to pay my own taxes, it was the only way to do that 
And, well when I signed the contract and stuff, I guess, I was out loading 
the hay and he brought me the papers to sign. We were putting hay on the 
truck and getting ready to go to Los Angeles. I signed them to get ready to 
go and that is about the extent I remember. 
JUDGE How did he tell you you would be paid? 
BENNETT Well, he just told me that I would be paid 15$ a mile and be paid - get a 
check from him on regular pay periods. 
JUDGE How often were you paid? 
BENNETT It seems like every two weeks - I can't really remember every two weeks or 
just twice a month. 
JUDGE Do you have a document there labeled exhibit #7? Entitled Wage Schedule? 
BENNETT That was #7? 
JUDGE Yes. 
BENNETT Yeh, I got that. 
JUDGE Does that look familiar? 
BENNETT This gives a detailed list of the payments for trips. Were your trips based 
upon this type of schedule. 
BENNETT Well, I guess they was. I didn't know anything about I was told that I 
would just be making 15$ a mile and he had a trip deal set up for that 
amount for miles. 
JUDGE Were vou Daid for loadina or unloadina the truck? 
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SETT Yeh. There was a certain fte for unloading and one for loading, depending 
upon whether it was done with a forkllft or by hand. It was more 1f I 
tver had to load 1t by hand. I never did do that anyway. 
GE Do you have an exhibit there labeled exhibit #9? 
NETT Yup. 
6E Do you recognize that exhibit? 
NETT Well, now there are a couple heret one 1s b 
'GE $ a , 9b and 9 c ? I n d e p e n d e n t C o n t r a c t o r Agreement 
INETT Well yea. 
IGE Is that similar to the contract you signed? 
INETT I believe it probably 1s. I can't tell you for sure but it looks alot like 
it. 
)GE Did you drive any particular tractor-trailer? 
JENTT No, I just drove any one of the ones he had going. I was never assigned to 
one specific one. 
)GE You never had a particular one that was your responsibility? 
WETT No, I didn't. Lots of times I would drive a truck for a guy that wanted a 
day off, some time off, I would take his truck. 
DGE How did you know whether there was a trip to be made? 
NNETT Well, he would call me up at home, I was living in Holden with my dad, and 
he would call there to tell me where the truck and where I had to deliver it. 
DGE Could you have refused to accept that trip? 
NNETT Well, there was a few times I told him I wouldn't go, but it would be like 
I don't know, if I didn't want to work for a day I would just tell him I 
didn't want to take it. 
DGE So you were free to accept or reject any trip? 
NNETT Well, I guess, more or less, yes. 
•DGE You mention that you delivered the hay to an area in L.A. Is that correct? 
!NNETT Yes. 
IDGE Was that the same place you delivered it to every time? Did your destination 
vary? 
:NNETT Well, every time that I hauled hay, down there, when I took it, I took it to 
(?) you know, it is in the area of L.A. I never hauled hay any other place. 
JUDGE 
BENNETT 
JUDGE 
BENNETT 
JUDGE 
BENNETT 
JUDGE 
BENNETT 
JUDGE 
BENNETT 
JUDGE 
BENNETT 
JUDGE 
BENNETT 
JUDGE 
BENNETT 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
CHRISTENSEN 
JUDGE 
ANDERSON 
BENNETT 
ANDERSON 
Did vou haul anything on the rtturn trip? 
Yes, we would bring back, well just shingles, anything, about anything you 
could you could get on a flatbed. 
How did you know whether you had a trip coming back? 
Well, when I got down there and got the hay unloaded I would call him and 
he would tell me where to go and pick 1t up and where 1t was supposed to be 
delivered. I would go from there. 
Did you ever arrange any of these trips yourself? 
No, I never did. 
Where would you generally pick up the truck? 
Well, I picked 1t up over there at Fillmore at other drivers places and 
I have picked 1t up at Flowell at his yard. 
Where would you return the truck? 
Either drop it off at one of the other drivers place that I picked it up 
from or down there at Flowell. 
Who furnished the gas and oil and maintenance for the truck. 
Well, I would fuel up down there - I guess he would. I would fuel up at 
Flowell before I left and there was an account sat up in Mesquite, Nevada 
where I fueled up - those were about the only two places I ever did fuel. 
Did you ever pay for fuel yourself? 
No, I didn't. 
Did you have any expenses that you incurred performing this driving service? 
No, I didn't, just food and stuff like that that I paid for myself. 
Anything you would like to ask Mr. Christensen? 
On that last question, when he bought food, was that out of his own pocket?' 
Yes, he said he took care of his own food. 
It wasn't reimbursed? That is the only thing I had. 
Counsellor, do you have a -some questions for this witness? 
A couple. Mr. Bennett I am Dexter Anderson, attorney for Dave Ellison. 
How long did you drive truck for Ellison, Inc.? 
About two and a-half to three months, I believe. 
Would that have been in 1984 or 1985? 
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ERSON According 1;O our records 1t wai during 1985* 
NETT Well, yeh because 1t was October or November, around there when I quit, 
that would be right. 
ERSON During that period of time, did you drive truck at all for anyone else? 
NETT No, I didn't. 
»ERS0N Did you have any regular route to follow? 
INETT Well, I just go down 1-15 and right Into LA, and that was the basic set 
route to go on. 
(ERSON What I am saying 1s, did you have a regular route and schedule to follow? 
In other words, you had to stop 1n certain places and pick up a load and 
deliver a load at certain times and be at certain destinations at certain 
times. 
METT I guess, in a way you leave here and if you left Sunday you had to be there 
Monday morning to unload and then after that it just depended what time you 
got reloaded to where you would have to be and unload the next load. 
)ERS0N Well, if you decided that you wanted to spend the night before loading up 
and coming back, did you have the right to do that? 
WETT Well, I don't know, I guess you could say you could take that time. I don't 
believe it was in the plans at all. No. You were expected to get the hay 
off and get loaded as soon as you could and head back out. 
DERSON Did you have a regular time period each week that you worked and time periods 
that you had off work. In other words did you go to work each Monday at 8 
o'clock and work until 5 o'clock monday afternoon? 
NNETT No, there was no time set up like that at all. It just depended what time 
the truck got in to what time I would leave - when I took another guys truck 
it just depended when it showed up and got loaded to when I left. 
DERSON On back-hauls, would Mr. Ellison sometimes give you a choice between two or 
three back-hauls, and you would take the one you wanted? 
NNETT No, I was never given a choice, he would just tell me where to go and pick 
it up and that was it. 
IDERSON Sometimes did you have a choice, did you ever have a situation where you 
had a choice? 
.'NNETT Well, personally I never had the situation, he would just tell me where the 
loads was and as far as I was concerned that was where I picked it up. I 
didn't worry about arguing about it. 
IDERSON Well, I don't mean arguing -
•NNETT I mean, I was never given -as far as I know, he just- I would call him up and 
he would tell me where the load was and where to pick it up and what I was 
hauling - that was ill, there was only a mention of one load to me. 
to be delivered, to me. He never has told me about two or three loads 
and asked me which one I wanted, no. 
ANDERSON Did you keep any hourly record of the time that you worked and turn them 
1n to Mr. Ellison? 
BENNETT No, I didn't. 
ANDERSON How did you report to him as to what you should be paid? 
BENNETT Well, he - I would make the trip down there and I would have the bill of ladl 
showing where I lived, where I delivered the hay - would be signed and then 
what I picked up from the other outfits would be signed and as far as I know 
I just turned them 1n and I was paid on from Fillmore to whereever I delivere 
1t -...a certain amount of miles going down and then I was paid for unloading 
time and loading time and a certlan amount of miles back from L.A. to Fillmor 
ANDERSON As I understand 1t, you didn't have some form or paper to turn 1n where you 
reported your mileage or your time. 
BENNETT No, I didn't. 
ANDERSON They were just figured by the Ellison's from your bill of ladings? 
BENNETT Yeh, I believe he figured them from the map, from one point to the other poin 
ANDERSON Did you keep a record of your own, for your own use of the trip that you made 
BENNETT Well, I really didn't rather than on my log books at the time. 
ANDERSON When you took a trip for another driver who would contact you about that? 
BENNETT Mr. Ellison would. 
ANDERSON You remember times when you didn't want to go on a load so you would tell 
Mr. Ellison and you wouldn't have to go, is that correct? 
BENNETT Well, there was lots of times I would tell him I would rather not take it 
and he would either talk me into taking it or I wouln't take it - you know 
depending on the circumstance or whether I wanted the time off. 
ANDERSON You didn't lose your job because you didn't want to take a load then? 
BENNETT No. 
ANDERSON Did you kind of govern then, how many, govern for yourself, how many loads 
you would take during a week? 
BENNETT Yeh, more or less. I wouldn't take any more that I felt like I could handle. 
ANDERSON If you wanted to go deer hunting or go on a vacation, you just wouldn't take 
the load? 
BENNETT Well, - more or less, yes I believe you could say that . 
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IERSON I don't want to put words Into you mouth» I Just want to understand what 
you are saying. 
INETT Well (Inaudible) just Hke any other Job Pve ever had. Usually I have 
been able to work my time out with my boss. Sometimes I ended up upset or 
he ended up upset - kind of the same deal. 
)ERS0N Would you - I appreciate that. I don't have any other questions now. 
)GE I have one further question for you Mr. Bennett, did you keep log books? 
You mentioned a log. 
WETT Yes, I did. 
DGE What was the purpose of that log? 
NNETT Well, 1t was for your driving hours to go along with the law, how many hours 
you worked each week. You had to keep records of that so you couldn't drive 
over seventy hours a week. 
DGE Is this a record you kept personally for yourself or did you turn those in to 
Mr. Ellison? 
NNETT I turned them into to Dave - you have to have them for the DOT and he had to 
have a copy of them. 
DGE So, this is something that is required of a driving operator to maintain for 
the law. 
NNETT Yes. 
IDGE Anything further Mr. Bennett? 
.NNETT NO, Not that I know of. 
IDGE Anything further that you have of Mr. Bennett. We will excuse you. 
Let's get ahold of Paul Boles. Mr. Boles, this is Judge Major, we are 
ready for your testimony. Place you on a speaker phone, I have here with me 
Mr. Drew Christensen, field auditor for the Department, Dexter Anderson, 
counsel for the employer and Mr. Ellison is also present. OATH GIVEN AND 
ANSWERED IN AFFIRMATIVE. Would you please state your name and address. 
)LES Paul Boles,Star Route, Box 244, Fillmore, Utah. 
JDGE Thank you. What is your occupation? 
)LES Truck driver. 
JDGE How long have you been a truck driver? 
DLES Off and on for about 8 or 9 years. 
UDGE Did you have an occasion to contract your services with Mr. Ellison? 
OLES I can't hear you. 
"" ' - - . • . - - - • -J . - . . ~^„ •*.,»,•+ +/X sfviua f o r Mr. - E l l i s o n ? 
BCLES Yts. 
JUDGE Would you tell me how you obtained that contract? How you found out about 
the work? 
BOLES I Just was talking with Dave. 
JUDGE Did you know him personally, or did you respond to an ad? 
BOLES No, I knew him personally. 
JUDGE What was your understanding of the contract? 
BOLES I said I would work for him on a - as a contract laborer, basically working 
for myself. I would drive loads from Fillmore and Chlno, California and 
back. 
JUDGE What was the basis of your payment? 
BOLES Would you say that again. 
JUDGE How was your pay determined? 
BOLES By my performance, how much work I did - just like anyplace else. 
JUDGE Were you paid an hourly wage, were you paid my the mile, by the trip. Would 
you give me a basis of your pay? 
BOLES By the trip. 
JUDGE Did you receive some documents that have been labeled as exhibits? 
BOLES Did I receive some documents? 
JUDGE Along with your subpoena? 
BOLES Yes, I did. 
JUDGE Do you have a document that has been labeled exhibit #7? Wage schedule? 
BOLES I am having a hard time, I have been in an accident. I probably have it hem 
JUDGE Can you locate that document among the papers you have? 
BOLES Okay. 
JUDGE Have you seen this document before? 
JUDGE Is this the basis of your payment? 
BOLES Yes. 
JUDGE So you received payment according to the trips as outlined in this schedule? 
BOLES Yes, sir. 
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iE I f you did unloading or loading you were paid according to the fee? 
:S Yes 
»E How did you know whether you had a trip to take? 
:S Through Dave. 
»E How did he contact you? 
ES By phone. 
BE Were you free to accept or reject the trips? 
ES Yes, pretty much so, yeh. 
GE Did you ever reject any trips? 
ES Yes, once. 
GE Why did you reject that trip. 
ES It wasn't actually a trip - it was - I messed up and got down late, he gave 
me the option to stay for the weekend or come home. It was up to me. 
>GE Did all your trips originate from Fillmore? 
IS Oh, pretty much, some from Salt Lake. 
IGE You would go down to Chi no, California is this correct, to deliver hay? 
.ES Yes. 
)GE What about return trips, what would take place there? 
.ES Well we would call Dave and see what he had going back, get a load and come 
back. Just like you would do for any other trucker, or anybody else. 
)GE Would he tell you where to pick up a load? 
.ES Yes. 
DGE Did you have an option of whether you picked that up or not? 
LES No, I never did run across that -
DGE So, you always picked up the load, then? 
LES Sure. 
DGE Were you given a time or day in which that pickup was to be made? 
LES We just went over and got it. 
DGE So when he told you - you would more or less immediately go and get it at 
that time? 
BOLES Sun. 
JUDGE Did you have to return according to any specified schedule? 
BOLES Not usually. Just like any other, as far as driving - you get loaded you 
come to your destination. 
JUDGE Could you have taken your time as you pleased, to return? 
BOLES I usually did, yes. 
JUDGE Okay, 1f you wanted to stop somewhere on the road back for two or three days 
to fish, could you have done that? 
BOLES That would be hard to answer, I don't know. I never ran across something 
like that to happen. 
JUDGE So you basically promptly returned then? 
BOLES I did what I thought was fair - got back the way I would. 
JUDGE Did you incur any expenses in performing these services? 
BOLES You are going to have to explain yourself - road expenses which you have. 
JUDGE Did you pay for any gas or maintenance of the tractor-trailer? 
BOLES No sir. 
JUDGE What expenses did you incur? 
BOLES Things that you need on the road. Food, whatever else you need. 
JUDGE Food and lodging? 
BOLES Yeh. 
JUDGE Did you have any particular tractor-trailer assigned to you? 
BOLES Yeh, I did. 
JUDGE Which one was that? 
BOLES No. 10. 
JUDGE Did you have any particular responsibilities for that tractor-trailer? 
BOLES To make sure that it was kept up so we could work. If you don't keep it up 
you won't be able to work. 
JUDGE And what did you do in order to keep up that tractor-trailer? 
BOLES Checked it out before you leave on a long trip to make sure things were 
working up to par. 
JUDGE Is this common for truck drivers to do? 
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ES Surt. 
6E While you were driving for Mr. Ellison, did you drive for anyone elie? 
ES Well, yen, I did. Took one load for myself. 
GE Do you want to explain that? 
ES I took a load of hay to Salt Lake. 
GE Who was that for? 
.ES For me. 
>GE You were purchasing the hay yourself? 
.ES Yes. 
)GE For your own use? 
.ES Right. 
)GE Other than that, did you drive for anyone else? 
.ES No. 
DGE Are you still currently working for Mr. Ellison? 
LES Yes sir, I am. 
DGE Who were you working before you worked for Mr. Ellison? 
LES I worked for Budget Stop. 
DGE Did you drive for them? 
LES I did. 
DGE What type of work was that? 
LES I worked graveyard shift - I ran the graveyard shift a truck stop here in tojou 
DGE Do you own a tractor-trailer? 
1ES No, I don't. 
DGE Mr. Christensen, do you have any questions? 
IRISTENSEN No 
IDGE Counsellor? 
IDERSON Paul, this is Dexter Anderson. Did you have any regular work schedule that 
you had to follow? Did you have to be to work at such and such a time and 
work until such a time? 
ANDERSON Wert you able to govern for yourself, how many trips you might take during 
a months time? 
BOLES Definitely. 
ANDERSON So, you would work as much as you wanted to then? 
BOLES Right. 
ANDERSON Or as little as you wanted to? 
BOLES Yes sir. 
ANDERSON I assume that you had to work as much as you could to make a living then? 
BOLES Yes. 
ANDERSON Do you support a family? 
BOLES Yes, I do. 
ANDERSON On the back-hauls, Paul, did you ever have an option between two or three 
different loads? 
BOLES Yeh, I have. 
ANDERSON How did you decide which load to bring back then? 
BOLES You mean, myself? 
ANDERSON You just judged for yourself which ones you wanted to bring back? 
BOLES Right. 
ANDERSON How often did that happen? 
BOLES When the opportunity arose. Sometimes you only got one or two loads and 
you don't have that option. 
ANDERSON If there was more than one back-haul to come back, Dave would give you that 
option? 
BOLES Yeh, I have had that option lots of times. 
ANDERSON Did you have any regular route to follow and pick up points and drop off 
points that you had to make? Did you understand that question? 
BOLES No, I don't. 
ANDERSON Well, did you have a regular schedule or route to follow? 
BOLES No, I didn't. 
ANDERSON If you felt tired and wanted to stop and rest, were you free to do that? 
BOLES Yes sir. 
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ERSON I think we may have misunderstood your testimony ibout driving for someone 
else. You said you took some hay to Salt Lake - you took that up and sold 
1t yourself, d idn ' t you? 
IS Yes. 
(ERSON The hay wasn't for your own use, was 1t? 
.ES No, 1t wasn't. I sold 1t to a guy that had some race horses up north. 
)ERS0N So you saw a chance to make some Income for yourself and you did that. 
.ES Yes sir. 
)ERS0N There 1s nothing wrong with that, we just wanted to understand 1t. Did you 
keep any hourly record of the number of hours you worked and turn them Into 
Dave? 
.ES How many hours I worked? 
)ERS0N Yes. 
LES I don't understand what you are saying. 
DERSON You didn't keep a book or something where you wrote the number of hours 
that you actually were working. 
LES No, just -
DERSON Who decided how much you had coming. Did you turn in some sort of a record 
or form or something on the number of trips you made? 
LES No, the paper work that was - that you turn in, like you bill of ladings on 
each load. Which is true with any business.As far as personal records - no. 
Except my own records which nobody kept except me. 
DERSON You kept some personal records for your own information? 
LES Yes. 
DERSON Why did you do that? 
1ES Tax purposes. 
IDERSON So you could check and see if you were getting all the money that you had 
worked for? 
)LES Mainly for that and tax purposes. 
IDERSON When you started driving truck, was anything said to you about who had to 
pay the taxes? 
)LES You mean my taxes? 
IDERSON Yes. 
BOLES Yts. 
ANDERSON What was said? 
BOLES Well, I was hired on as contract labor and I knew I had to pay my own taxes. 
I made arrangements to do so. 
ANDERSON You accepted that, then? 
BOLES Yes. 
ANDERSON I believe that 1s all I have Paul. 
JUDGE Mr. Boles 1s there anything further you would like to say? 
BOLES No. 
JUDGE Anything further Mr. Christensen? Thank you for your time. 
Roger Chappeil, please. This 1s Judge Major. Put on speaker phone. Mr. 
Chappeil I have with me Drew Christensen, Field Auditor for the Department, 
Mr. Ellison 1s present and Dexter Anderson, attorney for employer 1s also 
present. OATH GIVEN AND ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. State your name and 
address. 
CHAPPELL Roger Chappeil, 120 West 300 North, Fillmore, Utah. 
JUDGE What is your occupation? 
CHAPPELL Truck driver. 
JUDGE How long have you been a truck driver? 
CHAPPELL Approximately 5 years. 
JUDGE Are you currently working for Mr. Ellison? 
CHAPPELL No. 
JUDGE Who are you working for presently? 
CHAPPELL (unintelligible) - in Richfield, Utah 
JUDGE When did you begin working there? 
CHAPPELL Approximately April 15th, this year. 
JUDGE Did you have an occasion to enter into a contract with Mr. Ellison? 
CHAPPELL No. 
JUDGE Did you perform services for Mr. Ellison? 
CHAPPELL Yes, (unintelligible) and as an employee. 
JUDGE When did you begin driving for Mr. Ellison? 
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IE How did you obtain that work? 
PELL On personal contact with Dave Ellison. 
IE Was that contact an attempt to find 1f he had work or did you know that he had 
work available. How did that take place? 
'PELL I approached him on the basis I was looking, I didn't know 1f he had any 
openings or not, I was looking for work and I approached him. 
IE So at the time, you didn't have work* 
>PELL At the time I was 1n the process of changing - a job change... 
IE Where were you working before you approached Mr. Ellison? 
>PELL I was working as a distributor for Western General Dynamics. 
iE And that was driving? 
>PELL Yes. 
iE Was that as an employee or as a contractor? 
>PELL Contractor. 
SE The current job you have now with Valium, is that as a contractor or employee? 
>PELL Employee. 
3E When you met with Mr. Ellison, did you discuss the basis of your services 
you would be performing? 
3PELL Yes, that was brought up. The pay schedule, I suppose you are referring to. 
3E How did he tell you you would be paid? 
PPELL By mileage, paid by mileage. 
3E Did he tell you a specific amount per mile or by the total miles driven? 
PPELL He would pay me 15tf a mile, plus Toadfng and unloading. 
SE Your loading and unloading, was that per hour or by fee? 
PPELL By fee as indicated on the exhibit -
GE Are you referring to exhibit #7? 
PPELL Yes. 
GE Did you receive your payment according to this trip schedule then? 
PPELL Yes. 
GE
 Were vou assianed any particular tractor-trailer? 
HAPPEU A tractor, yes. Trailers, we get a request» you know, sometimes once 
e week, depending upon what needs to be done...we were isslgned to one trad 
UDGE What determined what tractor you would be assigned to? 
HAPPELL Well, I don't know unless 1t would be based upon seniority and the amount 
of time with the Company. 
UDGE Which tractor were you assigned to? 
HAPPELL No 4. 
UDGE Did anybody else use that tractor? 
HAPPELL No, not unless it was a relief driver. 
UDGE How would you know whether you had a trip available to run? 
HAPPELL We were notified in advance - when we would be leaving and there were always 
loads available and ready to go when you got back to the yard. 
UDGE Who would notify you? 
HAPPELL We would check in with Dave on a daily basis and find out - you know. 
UDGE Were you told what time your trips were to leave? 
HAPPELL We were given a general idea of when they needed to be gone. Yes. 
UDGE How much latitude did you have in when you left. 
HAPPELL We generally - early morning and (inaudible) that evening. Give a chance to 
get some rest at home, take care of things there before leaving on the 
next load. 
UDGE Where did you deliver your loads to? 
HAPPELL The majority went to Chino, California. 
JDGE How are back-hauls handled? 
HAPPELL We would - after loading we would call in and were told where to pick up a-Tc 
what we were to pick up then we would go load them and came home. 
UDGE Were you given an option as to whether to take the back-haul or not? 
HAPPELL No. 
JDGE So you did need to take the back-haul? 
HAPPELL Yeh. 
JDGE Were you given as option of which back-haul you might take? 
HAPPELL Most of the time no, that was pretty well predetermined what we would take. 
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Were you ever given an option of two or three ind you chose which one? 
'Ell ,..generally speaking, 1t was pretty well decided before hand where we 
would go. 
Did you Incur any expenses 1n performing your driving services. 
>ELL Any expenses other than fuel expenses -
: Any personal expenses. 
>ELL No. 
: Were a l l expenses Incurred by the El l ison, Inc.? 
PELL Yes. 
E When you returned your tractor-trailer, were you required to return that 
to any specific place? 
PELL Generally we would park at our homes or out to the yard. 
E Did you use that tractor-trailer for your personal use? 
PELL No. 
E Do you have a document which has been labeled as exhibit #9, 9a through 9c? 
PELL Yes. 
£ Did you sign such a document? 
PELL No. 
IE Have you seen this document before that was sent to you? 
'PELL No. 
IE Were you aware that the drivers were working under such a written document? 
>PELL No. 
5E Anything further you would like to state, Mr. Chappell concerning your 
service that you performed? 
>PELL No, I think everything has been covered. 
3E Mr. Christensen, do you have some questions? Counselor? 
ERSON Mr. Chappell, this is Dexter Anderson, a couple of questions if I can. 
PPELL Okay. 
ERSON Did you ever have an option as to whether or not you would take a load of 
hay to California or go on a load. Could you say yes or no as to whether 
nr nnt vnii wanted t o QO? 
HAPPELL 
NDERSON 
HAPPELL 
NDERSON 
HAPPELL 
NDERSON 
HAPPELL 
NDERSON 
HAPPELL 
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HAPPELL 
NDERSON 
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HAPPELL 
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HAPPELL 
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HAPPELL 
Y«s, we w e n g1*en that option. If we - the option was available to us. 
Someone else could take the load down for us. 
Old you ever do that, say no I would rather not go? 
Yes. 
Did that jeopardize your job? 
No. 
How did you become familiar with the schedule of payments for the trips, 
do you remember? Exhibit #7. 
I knew we were paid out of the monies made and a - the other drivers In-
dicated we were paid so much for loading and unloading, and after I 
started receiving pay checks, there was a breakdown of how we were paid. 
Did you use this schedule, exhibit 7, to decide - find out how much you 
had coming then? 
Yes, that was the standard - yes. 
What - did you keep track of any hours that you spent working? 
No I didn't. 
Did you have any regular work schedule to follow, like Monday through 
Friday, 8 to 5 - anything like that? 
No. our work was generally scheduled from the time Sunday night, Monday 
morning type - we would leave generally Sunday night or Monday morning 
we would work - loaded and on our way home Friday evening. We had the 
weekends off. 
Would you drive than, in such a manner that you could meet your own schedule 
as to when you wanted to be home and so forth? 
Pretty much - yes. 
If you needed to stop and rest on the way home, or down, were you free to 
do that? 
Yes. 
If you - did you pay for your own food and lodging on the road? 
Yes. 
You didn't pay any of the fuel or oil or repairs or anything? 
No. 
Did you have to furnish any other equipment used on the truck? 
No. 
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SON Did you have a discussion with Mr. Ellison whan you starttd driving a 
truck as to who was going to pay the taxes and that sort of thing? 
ELL No. 
[SON What was your understanding as to who would pay the Income taxes? 
'ELL Well* 1t 1s my understanding that as an employer, he would take care of It. 
ISON How did you actually file your wages • your Income from Ellison, Inc.? 
How did you file your 1985 Income tax. 
'ELL I filed 1t like - I kept track of what my Income was and when I filed 
my Income tax - we had enough set aside, we could take care of that. 
*S0N So you -
'ELL That was taken care of - I took care of that when my taxes were done -
the person that prepared my taxes took care of that for me. 
RSON Did you have somebody prepare your taxes for you? 
PELL Yes. 
RSON Do you know whether it was reported as wages or business income? 
PELL It was reported as wages. 
RSON Did you have any responsibility for maintaining the truck? 
PELL No. 
RSON How long did you actually work for Ellison, Inc.? A couple of months, or 
PELL It was 8 to 9 months. 
RSON You said that you were working as a contractor for Western general Dairies 
just tell me basically what you did for General Dairies. 
PELL As an independent contractor - the delivery of dairy products. 
:RS0N You drove a truck? 
•PELL Yes. 
iRSON And made deliveries? 
>PELL Yes. 
IRSON Did you have to pay for any of the fuel or expenses of running that truck? 
5PELL With my own truck - I was responsible for my own expenses, yes. 
ERSON I t was your own truck? 
HAPPELL At the time, yes. 
NDERSON I don't have any other questions. 
IUDGE Anything further you would like to state, Mr. Chappell? 
HAPPELL No. 
FUDGE Any further questions for this witness? - We will contact Mr. Curt 
Wilcox. Mr. Wilcox, this 1s Judge Major, we are ready for your testimony. 
Put on speaker phone - I have with me Drew Chrlstensen, Field Auditor 
for the Department, Mr. Ell 1 son 1s present and Dexter Anderson, counsellor 
for Mr. Ellison. OATH ADMINISTER AND ANSWERED IN AFFIRMATIVE. State 
your name and address. 
fILCOX Curtis Wilcox, P.O. Box 1061, Fillmore, Utah. 
IUD6E What 1s your occupation? 
IILCOX Mechanic and driver. 
IUDGE Who are you currently working for? 
IILCOX Dave Ellison, Inc. 
IUDGE When did you begin working for Mr. Ellison? 
IILCOX Oh, dear, well it has been several years, on and off, probably started abou 
8 years ago. 
IUDGE Did you work for him during 1984 and 1985? 
IILCOX I would have to go back over my records, I think so. 
IUDGE Did you drive truck for him than? 
IILCOX Uh-huh. 
IUDGE Did you also perform mechanic services? 
IILCOX Mostly just driving a truck. I just started working as a mechanic about 
three and a-half months ago. 
IUDGE How were you paid for your work? 
fILCOX As far as the driving? 
IUDGE Yes. 
fILCOX We were paid - well it was an average for the trip. So much per mile to 
drive the truck. 
IUDGE Did you receive payment for loading or unloading? 
IILCOX Yes, - that was a set rate, so much per each load that went on the truck am 
so much for each load that went off. 
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How did you know whether you had work to perform? 
Pardon? 
How did you know when you had particular work to perform? 
We would call 1n to Dave on the telephone and he would tell us where 
we could load or unload. Where we were supposed to go. 
Were you free to accept or reject any of the trips? 
Oh, yeh, to an extent - there have been a few times when I have just -
when I couldn't go - I would tell him and he would have to find somebody else. 
We were klnda pretty much our own boss. 
Did you have back-hauls? 
Not at first. At first, we just hauled hay out to L A . and come back 
empty. Later on the hay got to where 1t wasn't paying enough to keep 
the trucks on so we started bringing freight back. 
How were the back-hauls handled? 
Well, at first, when we first started doing 1t, I just would talk to Dave 
and some of the people I knew and we would find our own load - we had to 
keep the trucks loaded by ourselves - I would have to call the people I 
knew and got my own load for the freight and then later on, by turning in 
the numbers and what I knew, to Dave, he would take care of it himself. 
We would just call him to see where he wanted us to load. 
When was that that you found your own haul-back. What year? 
Back when I first started driving for him I am not sure of the year. 
Would that have been prior to 1980? 
1980? 
Yeh, you mentioned you worked for 8 years. 
Lets see - a could have been either 1980 or around there. 
During 1984 and 1985 - Mr. Ellison would inform you where you could pick 
up a back-haul? 
Un-huh - yeh. 
Could you reject those flat back-hauls? 
Oh, not usually, because most of the time I wanted to get home and I 
would take whatever I could to get home. 
Could you come back empty? 
On occasion - not very often. 
IUDGE Could you have chosen to come back empty? 
fllCOX A - well I probably could have made that choice, but it pays me more to 
load end unload because we got paid wages to pick up the load, whatever 
we loaded - paid 1n addition to the mileage wage. So I Just loaded the 
truck and came home with a load. 
IUDGE During this period of time, 1984 and 1985, were you driving for anyone else' 
IILCOX You got me on a sticker there because there was a time that I quit working 
for Dave and went to work for another company - I am not sure exactly 
when that time was. I can't exactly remember that far back. 
IUDGE How long did you work for this other company? 
fILCOX I worked for about three different - positions, I worked as a mechanic 
for John Deere and I worked for Goodyear tire repair store here in town 
and fixed tires and then I worked for another trucking outfit here in 
Fillmore, three different jobs around that approximate period of time, I 
am not sure exactly the day and month, I am really not sure, without going 
into my records and finding out what I had done. 
UDGE You returned to work for Mr. Ellison after you worked for those three places 
ILCOX Un-huh. 
UDGE How long were you separated from Mr. Ellison? 
fILCOX Oh, probably on and off for about a year and a-half, maybe two years. 
UDGE During 1984 and 1985? 
fILCOX In 1985, I think I worked the complete year, 1984 maybe would have been just 
a half a year - partial year. It seems like it was in June of 1984 when I 
started back for him the second time. I am really not sure on th exact montt 
UDGE Were you assigned a particular tractor? 
ILCOX Yeh, we were given our own tractor and we were pretty much the operator of 
that specific equipment - to take care of it, make sure it was full of 
fuel and oil and we kept it clean, whatever, it was pretty well my tractor 
and if I didn't drive it I would have to find somebody that would take my 
place to make the run. 
JDGE Did you incur any expenses in the maintenance of that tractor? 
ILCOX As far as - ? 
JDGE Fuel, oil, maintenance? 
ILCOX No, we pretty well used Dave had accounts set up and we pretty - for fuel 
and oil, we could openly charge most of that. There have been, on occasion, 
on a different run, somewhere where there wasn't an account and I would 
have to use my expense and then turn in a receipt for reimbursement. 
JDGE Did you ever use that tractor for personal use? 
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OX A • no. 
E Could you have used that tractor for your own personal use? 
OX Oh, yes, probably at any time 1f I had had a need for 1t. 
E Could you have personally gone and contracted your own work and used 
that tractor? 
OX A - well, I don't know as far as that, making a wage or whatever, I don't 
know 1f I could have used the tractor for that, but - without checking or 
cl e a m l n g 1t with Dave, but I am sure I probably could have, by going 
through the proper channels. 
E Do you own a tractor or trailer? 
OX No, I don't. 
E Did you receive some documents that have been stamped as exhibits? 
OX Yeh, I did. 
E Do you have exhibit #9? 
OX I don't have them with me now. 
IE Do you recall signing an Independent Contractor Agreement? 
OX No, the contract agreement I had with Mr. Ellison was verbal. We had an 
understanding as far as payment and what I would and how I would operate 
the truck. 
IE Anything further you would like to state, Mr. Wilcox? 
:0X Not right off. All I can say is that the services I have had with the 
Company in the past have been to my liking. I have enjoyed my job and 
we have had a relatively good understanding between Dave and myself, I have 
enjoyed my job, as far as the pay scale, it has been satisfactory. Every-
thing about the job, I have enjoyed for the most part. 
!E Thank you Mr. Wilcox. Counsellor do you have some questions? 
:RS0N This is Dexter Anderson a couple of questions. Could you just characterize-
what you believe your relationship with Ellison, Inc. was as far as how you 
were working for them? 
)0X As far as a relationship I felt myself as my own person, or own boss like 
whenever I wanted to leave town I would call him for a load and then it was 
up to me to load or leave town, whatever, in a truck - I would go whenever 
I wanted to - he would leave that up to us. He had the loads to be delivered 
at a certain point and it was up to me as a driver to get there, I could 
leave whenever I wanted to or sleep about whenever I wanted to. There was 
no stipulation as to where I had to be at a certain time. I always thought 
of myself as my own boss or being my own person. He had requirements of 
loads that needed to be picked up and delivered, but if we didn't make it 
that was just part of the job, we just had to wait until the next day or 
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Were - 1f you didn't want to take a load, what would you do? 
Well» 1f we didn't want to take a load, we would either tell him that 
I didn't want to take a load and have to get somebody else to take 1t or 
find somebody to take my truck, you know, and go get the load. For the 
most part, the loads we hauled, I never had really too much qualms about 
taking or not taking 1t. That was part of the Job, I took the job to 
begin with and that 1s Just part of the Job. 
I take 1t * 1f you had a load to go and you needed to work and earn the 
money then? 
Right, Yeh, I had to go out and make a living and my job required that I 
pick up certain loads and that was just part of the job. 
Did you ever have a - well maybe we covered it, on the back-haul, did you 
ever have a choice on the back-haul you might bring back? 
Yeh, there were times when he only had one parcel of freight to pick up or 
a load of hay to haul, so I just took, that was the only thing that was 
available. Sometimes on occasions, there were different choices that I 
could make. I could take either or. 
How would you decide which load you wanted to take then? 
Alot of it was just my own knowledge of the load, how easy it was to tie 
down or to pick up or to do whatever. Alot of times when we were hauling 
the hay I would take the load that paid the most to me. So I could make a 
little extra money myself. 
Did you look at it from the standpoint as to how much you could make and 
take that load? 
Oh, yeah. I would do that. 
I don't have any other questions. 
Mr. Christensen, did you have any questions? 
I was wondering - he said it was a verbal contract, could he specify what 
some of the terms in that verbal contract were? 
Did you hear that Mr. Wilcox. You had a verbal contract with Mr. 
what did that contract consist of? 
Elliso 
Okay, when I first started working for Dave I didn't drive the trucks right 
from the beginning, this was way back when. When I first started for him 
all I did was - he would call me up if he needed a load of hay loaded and 
I would work with him loading his bales on the truck. As time went on he 
would say would you want to do this and I would say, yeah, I would take the 
truck here or there and unload hay here or there, whereever, here locally. 
I did not have a license to drive the long hauls, so most of it was just 
loading and unloading on a one time basis, he would call me and I would 
accept and go load. As time went on we just «• he would ask me do you want 
fn tako thp truck and qo here, I would say, what does it pay and he would 
+> A f f l f l hr\Hi 
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agreement that ht would pay a certain amount to go to a certain place 
and I had the option to either accept 1t or turn it down and let somebody 
elso take 1t. 
JTENSEN Who paid taxes on what you were paid? Was there anything withheld -
)X I am having a hard time hearing you. 
JTENSEN Was there any money withheld for tax purposes or were you accountable for 
your own taxes? 
)X No, as far as taxes and what not went, that was just another agreement 
that we had that that was not withheld and I covered that myself. I took 
care of 1t - my own Income tax and my own medical Insurance - problems or 
whatever Incurred. That was all understood that that was my expense. 
STENSEN That 1s all I have. 
E One more question for you Mr. Wilcox, you mentioned on occasion you would 
find your own replacement, is this correct? 
OX Yeh, sometimes. Alot of time we had people that were standing by that we 
could call on and alot of times Dave would find it himself, but there were 
times that he would ask me if I knew of anybody that could take the truck 
and I would let some of my friends, in fact I would let my own Dad take 
runs for me when I didn't want to go. 
E Any further questions of this witness? 
RSON No 
E Thank you Mr. W i l c o x , You a re excused. We have Mr. E l l i s o n ' s tes t imony 
l e f t . Do you want t o t a k e a short break. L e t ' s c o n t i n u e OATH GIVEN AND 
ANSWERED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. S ta te your name and t i t l e . 
SON David Ellison 
iE Are you a corporate officer of Ellison, Inc. 
SON Yes, I am P r e s i d e n t 
iE C o u n s e l l o r , would you l i k e t o proceed. 
:RS0N What k ind o f bus iness i s E l l i s o n , I n c . ? 
SON Ellison, Inc. is a hay brokerage and freight brokerage business and trucking. 
"RSON Who owns the t r u c k s used i n t h a t business? 
:S0N Ellison, Inc. 
^RSON Could you t e l l us who b a s i c a l l y owns E l l i s o n , I n c . ? 
[SON M y s e l f , David E l l i s o n and my w i f e Wendy E l l i s o n . 
NDERSON Who art the principal officers 1n the corporation? 
LIISON Wendy and David Ellison. 
NDERSON Is anyone else playing a substantial role 1n this business? 
LII SON No. 
NDERSON How are the trucks actually operated? Do you drive the trucks or somebody 
else. How 1s that managed? 
ILISON No I do not drive the trucks, I contract with drivers to drive the trucks. 
.NDERSON How long have you been doing that? 
ILISON Eight years. 
.NDERSON During the years 1984 and 1985, how did you have the trucks operating? 
ILISON The trucks were operated by contract laborers. 
.NDERSON We have an exhibit here referred to as exhibit 9a, etc. Are you familiar 
with that agreement? 
ILISON Yes. 
.NDERSON Will you tell the Judge what that is? 
ILISON This is an independent contractor agreement I enter into with anyone that i« 
driving my trucks so that they understand what their relationship to 
Ellison Inc. is. And shall be and what is expected out of them and Ellison. 
iNDERSON Any exceptions to that contract, as far as drivers are concerned during the 
years 1984 and 1985? 
ILISON No. 
iNDERSON You ahve seen e x h i b i t #3 , a l i s t of names are those the names of d r i ve rs 
you had during 1984 and 1985? 
ILISON These are employees, d r ivers I guess I had. These are people tha t a c t u a l l y 
have received compensation from me. 
iNDERSON Did you know each one of those ind iv idua ls personally? 
ILISON Yes. 
iNDERSON Are there any of them that you - that you had an exception with as far as 
how they were driving the trucks and how they were paid? 
ILISON No. 
INDERSON Did you have a discussion with each one of them as you let them drive the 
trucks as to how they would be working? 
•LLISON Did I have any exceptions? No. 
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RSON How were thest driven pild for the driving they did? 
SON We based 1t on a wage schedule, exhibit 7, we determined that by a per-
centage of the Income off the truck. Set this up for basis of payment. 
Originally 1t was based on percentage of the trucks revenue. I guess 
we didn't put anything there for loss of the truck. I guess we just 
figured we had to have profit for drivers, so we just based 1t on this 
and printed up this wage schedule and gave 1t to them and explained that 
that 1s the way they would be paid. 
.'RSON Has that been used during the year 1984 and 1985? Basis for payment? 
[SON Yes. 
•RSON Were there any exceptions to that? 
tSON No. 
•RSON You call 1t a wage schedule. Why do you call 1t wage? 
[SON Oh, I put 1t that way so they - I guess that is the only language I knew 
for compensation for work that they performed. 
ERSON But it isn't based on an hourly wage, an hourly time? 
ISON No. 
ERSON Some of them have indicated that they worked on a mileage basis. Can you 
explain that? 
SON I don't really understand how they accepted that as a rumor because they 
were never paid on a mileage basis. I think this wage schedule indicates 
that - it can be proven from that. The distance between the origin and 
the destination and then the wages that were paid are not 15$ a mile as 
the testimony has been given by some of the drivers. I think that they 
must have picked it up from other people. They didn't pick it up from 
me because I didn't pay them 15$ a mile. 
•ERSON You didn't figure what the amounts they had coming based on the mileage? 
.ISON No, I didn't. They may have estimated that because it is fairly close 
in some cases, probably, but I don't think you could find one instance 
in there where it is actually 15$ a mile based on those mileages. 
)ERS0N For example, it says - origin Fillmore, Utah and the first destination is 
Chino, California and that shows a round trip of $165 and a single trip 
miles, it does show mileage there. It shows the number of miles they will 
be traveling. 
.ISON Yes, I am sure that they came to their own conclusion - they could figure 
that out and estiamte how many it was, but it is not 15$, it just shows 
how many miles that is. If you multiply the amount of miles times the 
dollar amount it don't come out to 15$. 
3ERS0N Do you know what that comes out? 
LLISON No I don't, I have never figured 1t that way. We Just figure that we 
could afford to pay 20% to the driver and so we knew how much income 
the trucks would make and so we just based 1t on the percentage that we 
could afford to pay the driver. We come up with those figures and 
printed them out and we left them that way. 
NDERSON How do you determine then, from what record do you use to determine how 
much money a driver has 1n any particular time? 
LLISON Has coming? 
NDERSON Yes 
LLISON Just based on the trips that he has made. I keep track, we have bill of 
ladings that tell what the trucks have done. I have - keep track based on 
what the driver has turned in to me as to what they did, logs and receipts 
for what they did. 
NDERSON Do you have any sort of a route that you require the drivers to follow? 
LLISON No, I don't. 
NDERSON Do you have any kind of a work schedule, an hourly schedule that you re-
quire them to follow? 
LLISON No, I don't. 
NDERSON How do you determine when a particular truck might leave and come back? 
LLISON I don't have that - I "assign a load and tell them that load should be 
there Monday - that the people on the other end are expecting it on 
Monday and to call me when they get it delivered. 
NDERSON What happens if one of the drivers says that he doesn't want to go on that 
trip? 
LLISON I call and ask somebody else - give them the opportunity to take the trip. 
Just let them know it is available. 
NDERSON What consequence does a driver suffer then, if he doesn't take the trip 
you have called about? 
LLISON He has no consequence. I figured that I didn't have the right to impose 
a consequence upon somebody that had their free agency. 
NDERSON If they didn't go, they didn't get paid? 
LLISON That's right. 
NDERSON But the next trip you might have would be offered them without any con-
sequences? 
LLISON Yes. 
NDERSON What about the back-hauls? How would they be arranged? 
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I was basically a frtlght broker, I used other trucking companies to 
haul my freight for me. I would solicit freight from thlppers and 
manufacturers and I would have this log of freight that needed to be 
picked up. When my drivers called 1n I would tell them what was avail-
able and give them a 11st of those that were available at that given time 
and ask them 1f there were any of those loads they wanted. They could 
accept or reject any of those loads that I had to offer. 
tSON You used other trucking companies to haul any of that freight? 
iON Yes. 
*S0N Would other trucking companies call 1n and ask you for loads then? 
SON Yes. 
RSON That was d u r i n g t h e y e a r 1984 and 1985? 
SON Yes . 
RSON Did you basically then treat the other trucking companies that would call 
in and ask for loads, the same as you would those drivers that were driving 
your trucks? 
SON Yes. 
RSON Did you have any work schedule that the drivers had to follow, like certain 
times during the day or certain days during the week? 
SON No. There has been several times that trucks - you know, I just assumed 
that they would leave Sunday in order to get there Monday. There have 
been several times the trucks, as of Monday morning I would drive by 
where we keep the trucks and the trucks would still be sitting there, so 
without no indication, they just didn't take the load. That was my re-
sponsibility, my problem, it wasnft thiers and there was no consequence. 
RSON If the truck was still there Monday morning, then you would find someone 
else to take it? 
SON I would call that person first and talk to him for a reason why he didn!t 
take it and give him an opportunity to take it then, if they didn't want 
to or couldn't, I would give someone else an opportunity to go then. I 
would just ask them to check with me when they were available again. 
:RS0N Do you have any of these people on exhibit 3, that you would say didn't 
work full time as a driver? 
[SON Yes, quite, a few of them. 
:RS0N What else did they do besides drive for you? 
[SON They would drive for other people or load or unload freight for other people. 
This one has got a pump business, rebuilding and installing irrigation 
pumps. 
Who was that? 
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J1m Rhodes and Darren Rhodes. Michael Stevens owns his own truck, so does 
Don Cannon. 
They own their own trucks? 
Yes. They had their trucks parked and were driving for me. 
From time to time they would drive for you then? 
Yes. Roger Chappell owns his own truck. It 1s just. People would tell me 
all the time - they were asking for work - I have highway patrolmen and 
lots of people that 1s always looking for extra money because they are 
looking for spending money so they call me and ask me 1f I have any work 
that they can do. So I tell them what 1s available then they accept 1t 
or reject 1t. 
Even though they might have other employment. 
Yes. 
They are looking for work on a trip basis? 
Yes. 
That is all the questions I have. 
Mr. Christensen do you have some questions? 
A couple, he stated that these others have their own trucks. Did they drivi 
their trucks or your trucks when they made the hausl? 
Both. 
How many trucks does Ellison Inc. have on an average? 
It varies quite a bit. During 1984, 1985, four trucks, I guess it would be 
fair to say. 
One question I was never able to really resolve, who grew and owned the ha* 
originally? That was being hauled? 
Well, I mostly brokered the hay. I bought and sold the hay. 
It was other farmers besides yourself that was growing the hay. Some of it 
was your own and some was other farmers? 
Yes. 
That's all I have. 
When did you become a corporation? 
June of 1983. 
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SON Yts. 
E Did you tver have any problems with any of your driven driving for you? 
SON What do you mean by problems? I have problems all the time. 
E Problems caused by a driver -
SON Yes. 
E What type of problems might occur? 
ON Oh, physical damage to the trucks or the cargo. 
E What would happen on those occasions? 
SON I would just turn the claim over to the insurance company. I carry a 
physical damage insurance on the trucks. 
iE Did you ever have any problems with the drivers performance, how he 
handled himself? 
SON Oh, yeh, if I wasn't satisfied with the end result, I would mention it to 
them, if it wasn't satisfactory. If they would haul loads in and damage the 
load, you know, through neglect, I would let them know that it was not 
acceptable. 
IE Did you ever have an occasion where a driver was drinking while driving 
or anything like that? 
[SON I never had that problem. I did have one driver that had that problem, 
he never was convicted of it just accused of it. I never had that problem. 
5E Any further questions for Mr. Ellison? Any further statements you would 
like to make. Any comments or exceptions to any of the information in 
these documents by either party? I will take the information that has 
been given in the testimony and in the documents and use it as a basis of 
issuing a decision. The decision will be in writing and sent to both 
parties. This hearing is closed. 
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Ellison, Inc. : Employer No. 4-128112-0 
Sttr Route Box 231 : 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 : Case No. 86-A-3577 
APPEAL FILED: May 23, 1986 DATE OF HEARING: October 6, 1986 
APPEARANCES: Employer: PLACE OF HEARING: Salt Lake/Phone 
Dave Ellison, President 
Dexter Anderson, Atty. 
Department: 
Drew Christensen 
Witnesses: 
Don Bennet 
Paul Boles 
Roger Shappell 
Curt Wilcox 
ISSUE: 
Whether individuals included in the auditor's audit dated May 23, 1986 performed 
a service for a wage constituting employment. Sections 35-4-22(j)(l), 35-4-22-
(j)(5) and 35-4-22(p) of the Utah Employment Security Act are quoted on the 
attached sheet. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
On May 23, 1986 an auditor for the Department completed an audit of the employ-
er's records. The auditor found numerous truck drivers who received payment for 
driving tractor/trailers owned by Ellison, Inc., hereafter employer. The audit 
covered the period of second quarter 1984 through fourth quarter 1985. The 
auditor determined $191,498 of wages had not been reported to the Department. 
The employer is a hay and Freight Brokerage Company. The employer purchases hay 
from nearby farms and resells it to buyers in Southern California. The employer 
also ships the hay to the buyers in California by trucks which he owns and hauls 
freight on return trips. The employer contracts with drivers on an alleged 
"Independent contractor" basis. Some of the drivers verbally contracted with the 
employer while others entered into a written agreement. The written agreement 
purports the driver as an Independent contractor. The tractor/trailers are owned 
and maintained by the employer. Operational costs of the tractor/trailers such 
as gas, oil, tires, etc. are born by the employer. The employer insures the 
trucks and provides for liability coverage of all the cargo shipped. 
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The employer assigned the drivers is to which vehicle they will drive. The 
drivers ere paid in accordance to a wage schedule compiled by the employer. This 
schedule sets forth the amount of payment for loading, unloading, or driving 
trips between various destinations. 
Whenever a load of hay is to be shipped, the employer will contact a driver and 
Inquire whether he desires to take the load. The driver is free to accept or 
reject the assignment. However, the employer requires that the hay be delivered 
within a certain time frame in order to meet his contractual obligations with the 
buyers. The drivers pick up the tractor/trailer at the employees business 
in Flowell or at a designated spot in Fillmore. On one occasion, on a Monday, 
the employer noticed a loaded trailer sitting in Fillmore which needed to be de-
livered the same day. The employer informed the driver to either take the trip 
that day or he would obtain a different driver. 
The employer also acts as a freight broker and has access to freight needing to 
be hauled from locations around and about the initial delivery point to points on 
or around the return trip. After the drivers deliver the hay they are to call 
the employer for information concerning a back haul. If there is more than one 
possible back haul available the employer allows the driver to make a choice 
which freight he will back haul. Several of the drivers do not recall receiving 
an option for back hauls, but were told specifically which freight to back haul. 
Several of the drivers, such as Curt Wilcox, work full time for the employer. 
Others have worked part time or in between full time jobs. Don Bennet con-
tracted under the same conditions as the other drivers but only worked two to 
three months. The employer told him where to pick up the tractor/trailer, where 
to deliver the shipment and where to obtain a back haul. Upon return he would 
leave the tractor/trailer as instructed at a designated driver's home in Fillmore 
or at the place of business in Flowell. The employer did not allow Mr. Bennet or 
the other drivers to use the tractor/trailers for personal use. Mr. Bennet 
maintained log books for the trips in which he returned to the employer along 
with a bill of ladings, etc. upon the completion of each trip. Mr. Bennet 
voluntarily quit working for the employer and subsequently filed for unemployment 
insurance benefits. While working for the employer, Mr. Bennet did not drive 
for other trucking firms nor for himself. 
Paul Boles drove for the employer under the same conditions as the other driv-
ers. On one occasion Mr. Boles made an arrangement to purchase and sell some hay 
to a buyer in Salt Lake. He made arrangements to deliver the load himself. 
Other than this one incident, Mr. Boles drove exclusively for the employer during 
his contract with the employer. 
Roger Shappell, currently working as an employed truck driver for Diamond K 
Trucking, began working for the employer in August 1985. Mr. Shappell approached 
the employer looking for full time driving work. Prior to working for the 
employer, Mr. Shappell operated as a contractor delivering milk products for 
Western General Dairy. He owned his own truck and operated independent of 
Western. While working for the employer he drove the tractor/trailers owned by 
the employer according to the schedule provided by the employer. He did not sign 
any written contracts and believed he was being paid on a basis of $-15 per 
mile. While contracting with the employer, Mr. Shappell also worked under the 
same conditions as the other drivers. 
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Curtis Wilcox hes worked beslcelly full time for the employer under the seme 
conditions es the other drivers. However, he hes quit work for the employer on 
various occasions and went to work for John Deer as a mechanic, Goodyear Tire as 
a tire mechanic, and other trucking firms as a driver. 
Michael Stevens worked for the employer under the same conditions as the other 
drivers except he owned e truck. However, he did not drive his own truck. He 
drove the tractor/trailers provided by the employer, abiding by the same terms es 
all of the other drivers which contracted with the employer. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSION: 
The drivers working for the employer entered into an agreement to perform a 
service of driving the employers tractor/trailers to and from destinations 
arranged by the employer. They received a payment for their services. Payment 
for services may constitute wages for employment subject to the provisions of the 
Utah Employment Security Act. To determine whether the service performed 
constitute employment the law provides a definition of wages and employment. 
Section 35-4-22(j)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act defines employment as 
any service performed for wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral, 
expressed or implied. Wages as defined in Section 35-4-22(p) of the Act consti-
tute any remuneration for personal services. Although not defined by the Act, 
the Supreme Court in Blamlres vs Board of Review (Utah 584 P. 2d. 889 1978) 
stated the "contract of hire" is "construed to include any agreement under which 
one person performs personal services at the request of another who pays for the 
services." In Fuller Brush vs Industrial Commission (99 Utah 97, 107 P. 2d. 201 
1940) and also in Superior Cablevislon vs Board "oT Review (Utah 688 P. 2d. 444 
1984) the Court explained "if an individual renders personal services and was 
entitled to remuneration based on and measured by such personal services the 
person performing the service was under a contract of hire." In this case the 
employer entered into a contract with individuals as drivers to haul hay and 
freight to and from designated locations as instructed by the employer. They 
received payment based upon their service. Therefore, the Tribunal concludes the 
payment the drivers received constitute wages for employment under a contract of 
hire as defined by the broad perimeters of wages and employment as provided by 
the Utah Employment Security Act and interpreted by the Supreme Court. 
In the present case some of the drivers, extent unknown, signed an "independent 
contract or agreement" which the employer alleges establishes the drivers as non-
employees. Although the drivers may have signed such an agreement, the agreement 
does not in and of itself prevent the Department from determining whether an 
employment relationship exists. Such agreements which in essence waive an 
individual's right to unemployment insurance coverage is void pursuant to Section 
35-4-18(a) of the Utah Employment Security Act. Further, the Utah Supreme Court 
has stated in numerous decisions that such agreements are Ineffective in keeping 
an individual without the purview of the Employment Security Act when by their 
own actions they bring themselves within. (Leach vs. Industrial Commission (123 
Utah 423 260 P. 2d. 744 1953) and Creameries of America vs Industrial Commission 
(98 Utah 571 102 P. 2d. 300 1940). 
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Wages for employment are subject for unemployment Insurance coverage unless the 
services are exempt by the employer demonstrating to the satisfaction of the 
commission that the aervlces in question meet the requirements set forth in the 
"ABC" test pursuant to Section J5-4~22(J)(5) of the Utah* Employment Security 
Act. The exclusive provision of this Section is conjunctive. Therefore, all 
three elements of the test must be met In order for services to excluded from 
unemployment insurance coverage. The purpose of this test Is prevent an employ-
er's avoidance of employer obligations with respect to providing unemployment 
Insurance coverage by providing another label upon a relationship that is 
essentially employment. 
Test "A" requires that the individual performing the service be free from control 
and direction. If the employer for whom an individual works has the right to 
control and direct the way the individual works both as to final results and as 
to details of when, where and how the work is to be done then test "A" is not 
satisfied. The fact that the principal may allow the individual considerable 
discretion and freedom of action may be immaterial. The important factor is the 
employer has the right to control and direct. 
Although the employer argues that there is no control, the Tribunal finds 
considerable evidence demonstrating control and definitely a right of control. 
Control is exhibited by the establishment of the wage schedule, scheduling of the 
trips, calling in for back haul information, payment for expenses such as gas, 
oil, truck maintenance, etc. Further, a definite right of control exists wherein 
the employer owns the tractor/trailers which the drivers use. The employer has a 
right to insure that the drivers operate such vehicles in accordance to his 
desires. This is evident in the fact that the drivers may only use the tractor/ 
trailers as assigned by the employer. Although a driver may be free to accept or 
reject a driving assignment that in itself does not demonstrate independence. By 
rejecting an assignment the driver simply expresses that he does not wish to be 
employed for that particular job assignment. Further, the employer may effective 
discharge any driver by not calling any particular driver for a driving assign-
ment or by giving the assignment to someone else. This is demonstrated when the 
employer found a load had not departed timely and the employer told the driver he 
would obtain someone else if he did not leave the same day. 
Control is also shown in the manner in which the drivers pick up and return the 
tractor/trailers and have no right to use them outside of the employer's assigned 
trip or approval. The maintenance of logs, bill of ladings, and other paper work 
being reported to the employer upon a driver's return also portrays control. 
These factors and others stated within the findings portray the employer has 
considerable control and right of control such that the Tribunal finds test "A" 
has not been met. 
Test "B" requires the services to be outside the usual course of business or 
outside all places of business. The employer's business is considered as located 
in Flowell. The drivers did not work at the place of business except for 
incidental loading. Therefore, test tfB" is met. 
Test ,'C" requires that that individual performing the service be customarily 
engaged in an independently established endeavor. The adverbs customarily and 
independently modify the words engaged and established. The language used in 
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this statute contemplates thit the Individual be engaged In an independently 
established entity having t propriettry Interest to the extent that he can 
operate without any hindrance or support from any Individual whatsoever* Its 
continued existence does not depend on a relationship with any one employer. 
(Fuller Brush Company vs Industrial Commission (99 Utah 97, 104 P. 2d. 201 1940) 
and leach vs feoard of Review (123 Utah 423 260 P. 2d. 1953) 
Therefore, the drivers in question must operate regularly or habitually, separate 
and apart from the employer. The preponderance of the evidence does not support 
such a conclusion in the present case. The evidence only portrays Roger Chapel 
as ever operating an independent trucking entity. However, such independency 
transpired before contracting with the employer when he owned his own truck and 
delivered milk for Western General Dairies. There is not such evidence of the 
independency continuing during his contract with the employer. Michael Stevens 
could possibly be operating his own truck independently, however, he parked his 
truck and drove the employees tractor/trailer under the same condition as the 
other divers. Thus, the Tribunal does not find the fact in and of Itself that 
Stevens owned his own truck demonstrates Independency. The same holds true for 
the one trip in which Paul Boles made to Salt Lake on his own. 
The drivers contracting for the employer do not incur any of the expenses which 
an independent trucker would incur, such as gas, oil maintenance, insurance, 
tires, etc. Further the drivers do not have a capitol investment of a tractor/ 
trailer, etc. as does the employer. These expenses and investments are typical 
of an independent entity which could acquire a profit or suffer a loss. The 
clientele, buyers and freight supplies belong to the employer not the drivers. 
Upon separation from the employer the drivers have no clientele of their own. 
The employer bills the clientele and bears risk of any damage, bad debts, etc. 
The drivers do not possess a business license, maintain a separate place of 
business, competitively bid their work, advertise, etc. as would an independently 
established trucker or business such as the employer. These drivers drive for 
the employer as trips are available, as determined by the employer whether on a 
full time or part time basis. Even though the drivers may be free for others to 
hire them, such fact does not make them independent. The drivers would only be 
working a series of employment wherein none of the previous mentioned factors are 
present. Where the drivers in this case provide only their labor, then the 
Tribunal cannot find the evidence demonstrates they are customarily engaged in an 
independently established entity as required by Test "C". 
Although only one portion of the test need to fail to conclude these services 
constitute employment, the Tribunal finds both test "A" and WC" of Section 
35-4-22(j)(5) have not been met. Therefore, the Tribunal must hold the services 
performed by the drivers constitute employment subject to unemployment insurance 
coverage and the auditor correctly included wages paid to these individuals 
within his audit findings. 
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DECISION: 
The Tribunal affirms the Department's decision dated May 23, 1986 holding wages 
paid to drivers contracting with the employer constitute wages for service as 
employment pursuant to Section 35-4-22(J)(l), 35-4-22(J)(5) and 35-4-22(p) of the 
Utah Employment Security Act. 
•f^^&^ 
Administrative 
APPEALS TRI 
This decision will become final unless within ten days from October 28, 1986, 
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P. 0. Box 11600, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84147) setting forth grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
Jl 
cc: Dexter Anderson 
Star Route 52 
Fillmore, Utah 84631 
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Section 35-4-22(J)(l) of the Utah Employment Security Act etates: 
"Employment" means any service performed prior to January 1, 
1972. which was employment as defined in the Utah Unemploy-
ment Compensation Law prior to the effective date of this 
act, and subject to the other provisions of this subsection, 
service performed after December 31, 1971, including service 
in interstate commerce, and service as an officer of a 
corporation performed for waoes or under any contract of hire 
written or oral, express or implied. 
Section 35-4-22(p) states: 
"Wages" means all remuneration for personal services includ-
ing commissions and bonuses and the cash value of all 
remuneration in any medium other than cash. . . 
Section 35-4-22(j)(5) states: 
Services performed by an individual for wages or under any 
contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied, are 
deemed to be employment subject to this act unless and until 
it is shown to the satisfaction of the commission that: 
(A) The individual has been and will continue to be 
free from control or direction over the performance 
of those services, both under his contract of hire 
and in fact; 
(B) The service is either outside the usual course of 
the business for which the service is performed or 
that the service is performed outside of all the 
places of business of the enterprise for which the 
service is performed; and 
(C) The individual is customarily engaged in an 
independently established trade, occupation, 
profession, or business of the same nature as that 
involved in the contract of service. 
Section 35-4-22(r) of the Utah Employment Security Act states: 
Unless services would constitute employment at common law, 
"employment" shall not include services as an outside 
salesman paid solely by way of commission, and the services 
must have been performed outside of all places of business of 
the enterprises for which the services are performed. 
